August 1, 2008
by Faiz Shakir, Amanda Terkel, Satyam Khanna, Matt Corley, Benjamin Armbruster, Ali Frick, and Ryan Powers
TERRORISM
Ending 'The War On Terror'
The federally-funded RAND Corp. -- a public policy research institute that counsels the Pentagon -- released a study this week examining "how terrorist groups end" and concluded that the United States can defeat al Qaeda but only if it relies less on the use of military force and more on policing and intelligence. RAND conducted a quantitative analysis of 648 terror groups that existed between 1968 and 2006 and found that "most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups." While nearly half of the terror groups analyzed ended as a result of a transition into the political process, for those "that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy." The study noted that "[a]fter September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy against al Qa'ida centered on the use of military force" and that "U.S. policymakers and key national-security documents referred to operations against al Qa'ida as the war on terrorism [emphasis in original]." However, the study added: "The evidence by 2008 suggested that the U.S. strategy was not successful in undermining al Qa'ida's capabilities."
by Faiz Shakir, Amanda Terkel, Satyam Khanna, Matt Corley, Benjamin Armbruster, Ali Frick, and Ryan Powers
TERRORISM
Ending 'The War On Terror'
The federally-funded RAND Corp. -- a public policy research institute that counsels the Pentagon -- released a study this week examining "how terrorist groups end" and concluded that the United States can defeat al Qaeda but only if it relies less on the use of military force and more on policing and intelligence. RAND conducted a quantitative analysis of 648 terror groups that existed between 1968 and 2006 and found that "most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups." While nearly half of the terror groups analyzed ended as a result of a transition into the political process, for those "that cannot or will not make a transition to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy." The study noted that "[a]fter September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy against al Qa'ida centered on the use of military force" and that "U.S. policymakers and key national-security documents referred to operations against al Qa'ida as the war on terrorism [emphasis in original]." However, the study added: "The evidence by 2008 suggested that the U.S. strategy was not successful in undermining al Qa'ida's capabilities."
SHIFTING TO 'COUNTERTERRORISM': RAND noted that a political solution "is not possible" in diminishing or even ending the threat from al Qaeda but that the group's "resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S counterterrorism strategy." While "policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S. efforts," the study adds that "military force...may be a necessary instrument when al-Qa'ida is involved in an insurgency." However, the emphasis should be on local military forces, because "they have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all." But most importantly, the key component of this strategy "should include ending the notion of a war on terrorism and replacing it with such concepts as counterterrorism." The "war on terror" terminology "encourages others abroad to respond by conducting a jihad (or holy war) against the United States and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors." RAND's analysis of the data "suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force usually has the opposite effect from what is intended: It is often over-used, alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and provides a window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment."
GATES CALLS FOR 'SOFT POWER': A new National Defense Strategy approved by Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently echoes the RAND study's overall conclusions. The document argues that "success in Iraq and Afghanistan is crucial to winning this conflict, but it alone will not bring victory." The strategy embraces former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a "long war" against extremism but rejects Rumsfeld's focus on preemptive military action. The document emphasizes the use of "soft power" to undermine terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and to promote "economic, political and social development in vulnerable corners of the world." "The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development," the document says, adding that "the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves." Stressing that the U.S. focus on "irregular" warfare and counterterrorism, the new strategy urges the U.S. to build "collaborative and cooperative relationships" with Russia and China and calls for "an absence of fundamental conflict between great powers to shape the future, and to prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry."
EXPOSING BUSH'S NAIVETE: During the 2004 presidential campaign, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) said that the U.S. should combat terrorism in the same manner that the RAND study and the new National Defense Strategy now advocate: with less military force and more intelligence, policing and cooperation with allies. President Bush, however, smeared Kerry's strategy as "naive and dangerous" in 2004 and ran campaign ads that asked, "How can Kerry protect us if he doesn't even understand the threat?" Yesterday, Kerry delivered a speech to the Center for American Progress Action Fund (CAPAF) that reiterated his position from 2004: "We have to take our military-dominated 'war on terror' and remake it as the global counterinsurgency campaign that it always should have been." Quoting the RAND report, Kerry noted that "military action was the primary cause of a terrorist group meeting its final demise in just seven percent of the time." Kerry followed up his speech with an online discussion at TPM Cafe, where he outlined six key aspects of a successful global counterterrorism campaign and recommended that "everyone should read [CAPAF senior fellow] Brian Katulis' new book [The Prosperity Agenda] for a sense of how we win the war of ideas globally." Katulis's book, co-authored with former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nancy Soderberg, argues that the Bush administration's so-called "Freedom Agenda" as a means to defeat terrorist groups has not worked, and the next U.S. administration needs to focus on a more comprehensive strategy focusing on the basic security needs of individuals.
