Martin Kramer (Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies-Shalem Center)
- Unlike the Lebanon war of 2006, this war has been planned in advance, and every stage has been war-gamed. After the Hamas takeover in June 2007, Israel imposed a regime of economic sanctions on Gaza. The West Bank enjoyed an economic boomlet while Gaza languished under sanctions, with zero growth - reinforcing the message that "Islamic resistance" is a dead end.
- The Israeli operation is meant to impress on Hamas that there is something far worse than the sanctions - that Israel is capable of hunting Hamas on air, sea, and land, at tremendous cost to Hamas and minimal cost to Israel, while much of the world stands by, and parts of it (including some Arabs) quietly applaud.
- Hamas assumes (probably correctly) that its Palestinian opponents fed Israel with much of the intelligence it needed to wage precision warfare against Hamas. There is likely to be a vicious settling of scores as soon as a cease-fire is in place, if not before.
- The temptation to "engage" Hamas has grown, which means skirting the Quartet's insistence that Hamas not be "engaged" until it accepts past PA-Israel agreements, recognizes Israel, and renounces armed struggle. Legitimation of Hamas could seal the fate of the "peace process," and give "resistance" the reputation of a truly winning strategy.
- Israel is united in pursuing its war of demolition against Hamas. Its aim is not only to stop the rockets from falling in southern Israel, but to move a long stride forward toward a change of regime in Gaza.
