*Georgian opposition rejects European proposals for dialogue with government
*Armenia and Iran forge deeper trade ties and press ahead on strategic rail project
*Belarus seeks closer European ties
*Ankara and Yerevan agree roadmap to normalize bilateral relations
**New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog): Russian Ministry of Defense Announces Drastic Personnel Cuts
European Envoys Trying in Vain to Reason With Opposition in Tbilisi
The situation in Georgia also requires EU involvement on a higher level and with a more credible message than has hitherto been the case. Just, the radical extra-parliamentary opposition in Tbilisi -40 kilometers from the Russian armored force spearheads- is now poised to switch from "peaceful" tactics to calculated low-level violence, which (judging from Georgia's experience) could escalate beyond control (EDM, April 28). Laying siege to government institutions and plunging the capital city into chaos since April 9 could not reasonably be defended as peaceful tactics, but the bar has been set lower for the opposition and higher for the Georgian government to pass this test.
"For the sake of democracy, the government is tolerating many phenomena that Western European governments would not have tolerated," Parliamentary Chairman Davit Bakradze has told the assembled European ambassadors. "[Let] the population watch the developments with their own eyes and without restrictions and draw conclusions for themselves" (Rustavi-2 TV, April 25).
Western ambassadors stationed in Tbilisi have exerted every effort to bring the radical opposition into dialogue with the government. The ambassadors bent over backward to treat the radical leaders deferentially and never to criticize their excesses. But they could not persuade the radical leaders before April 9 to desist from starting the confrontation in the streets and cannot persuade them now to move to the negotiation table. This situation requires EU involvement on a higher level and with a more credible message than has hitherto been the case.
President Mikheil Saakashvili and parliamentary leaders had offered a dialogue long before the start of the current wave of demonstrations and persist with the offer, both publicly and through the Western ambassadors' mediation. Meeting with the ambassadors on April 25 Bakradze reconfirmed the agenda for dialogue: strengthening parliament's powers and its oversight functions vis-à-vis the executive branch, amending the electoral code so as to increase the opposition's parliamentary representation, steps to restore political confidence, and agreement on a program to overcome the economic crisis.
European envoys are increasingly concerned and frustrated by the opposition's strategy of confrontation. French ambassador Eric Fournier declared, "Because of the [opposition's] activists, the parliament chairman must hold meetings at a hotel, not in the parliament building. We regret that some people have decided to act against the law and violate the democratic constitution. It is inadmissible that we should gather at a hotel to meet the chairman of the parliament. This is a lamentable fact" (Rustavi-2 TV, April 25). The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly Secretary-General Terry Davis told the opposition that "any issues should be discussed in negotiations, not in the streets;" and reproached it for having refused to take up their parliamentary mandates after the 2008 elections (Rustavi-2 TV, April 28).
Opposition leaders, however, demand Saakashvili's resignation and the holding of general elections (only one year after the last elections). They denounce the "criminal Saakashvili regime," as they have done continuously since 2007, and insist that a dialogue should only pertain to the modalities of resignation and early elections (Imedi-TV, Public TV, Kavkas-Press, April 25-28).
Unaccustomed to and intolerant of European criticism, some opposition leaders bristle in response. One of them, French-born diplomat Salome Zourabichvili, felt duty-bound to apologize to the crowd at the rally over Fournier's remarks; and she retorted to "Davis or any Englishman" that their call for dialogue was like "dialogue with Hitler" (Rustavi-2 TV, April 28). Other opposition leaders, parochial and unfamiliar with European institutions, imagine as "Conservative" leader Kakha Kukava told the crowd, that Europe will pressure Saakashvili into a dialogue about resignation (Rustavi-2 TV, April 25, 27).
The authorities adhere to the policy of non confrontation, no physical contact with the opposition in the streets, and openness to dialogue toward a political agreement with opposition groups. Saakashvili called for such dialogue most recently in his April 23 speech at a factory outside Tbilisi and his April 28 remarks in the city, following a special church service convened by the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II. The Patriarch had publicly appealed to opposition leaders to attend the service; but they did not seem to be on hand, with the exception of Alliance for Georgia leader Irakli Alasania, who accepted to shake the president's hand (Imedi TV, April 28).
Alasania, with his small personal following, is attempting to stake an elusive middle ground between the radicals and the authorities. The radicals do not regard Alasania as one of their own and have treated his attempts at mediation as scornfully as they have the European envoys' efforts. Alasania attended and addressed the opposition rallies during the first phase after April 9, but seems to have dropped out from the meetings and the limelight afterward. The opposition's field has narrowed and the most radical elements now have that field all to themselves.
Yerevan and Tehran Strengthen Economic Cooperation
Armenia and Iran have agreed to deepen their already close relationship by pressing ahead with several large-scale commercial projects, mostly related to energy supplies. The two neighboring states formalized these plans during Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan's recent official visit to Tehran. Iranian leaders used the trip to reaffirm, in unusually strong terms, their commitment to enhance political and economic cooperation with Yerevan.
"The Iranian government and nation have enthusiastically welcomed the expansion of amicable ties with the Armenian nation and government," Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on April 14 as he received Sarksyan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad after their two-day negotiations (IRNA news agency, April 14).
Speaking at a joint news conference with his Armenian counterpart earlier that day, Ahmedinejad described those ties as "very deep-rooted, friendly and developing" and predicted a "very bright and promising" future for them. "Throughout their history the two nations have always trusted each other and enjoyed amicable ties," he said. "We are going to broaden our cooperation at regional and international levels," Ahmedinejad added, according to the official Iranian news agency.
The two presidents spoke to journalists after signing eight Armenian-Iranian memorandums of understanding. The most significant of those agreements fleshed out an ambitious idea to construct a railroad connecting the two countries -which will transform Armenia's transport and communications links with the outside world. The lack of such a rail link is considered a major hindrance to the development of Armenian-Iranian trade, which amounted to a modest $226.6 million in 2008. It also complicates the use of Iranian territory and accessing the Persian Gulf ports.
According to the two governments, the 470-kilometer railroad, with the bulk of it passing through Armenian territory, will cost between $1.2 billion and $1.8 billion and take at least three years to build. The Armenian Transport and Communications Minister Gurgen Sargsian revealed on April 20 that Iran will allocate a $400 million loan to Armenia for the planned railroad construction. Yerevan hopes to attract the rest of the necessary funding from international lending institutions and, in particular, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The ADB provided $1.5 million last fall for the first feasibility studies on the project. A delegation of the Manila-based bank is scheduled to visit Yerevan in May for further talks. Speaking on the eve of his visit to Iran, Sarksyan said that work on the railroad will start in 2010 at the latest (www.regnumonline.com.ar, April 10).
Another agreement signed in Tehran, envisages the construction of two large hydro-electric plants on the river Aras on the Armenian-Iranian border. The Armenian Energy Minister Armen Movsisian told journalists that they will be built by Iranian companies and that Armenia will finance its share of the $240 million project with electricity supplies to Iran (Arminfo, April 17). It remains unclear however, as to precisely when the construction will begin.
The two sides also formally agreed to start building a 300 kilometer pipeline to deliver petrol and diesel fuel from an oil refinery in northern Iran to Armenia. In December 2008 another pipeline project was inaugurated, which is designed to pump up to 2.5 billion cubic meters of Iranian natural gas to Armenia. With Russian gas already meeting Armenia's domestic energy needs, the bulk of Iranian gas is expected to be used for producing electricity, which will then be exported to Iran. Two of Armenia's three thermal power plants are currently undergoing a multimillion-dollar reconstruction -which may explain why Iranian gas deliveries have yet to start. Large-scale Armenian electricity exports also require the construction of a third and much more powerful high-voltage transmission line linking the Armenian and Iranian power grids. According to Movsisian, it will start in May and take at least two years.
The Armenian-Iranian agreements underscored just how far the Islamic Republic has gone in cooperating with its sole Christian neighbor since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite sharing a religious affinity with fellow Shia Muslim Azerbaijan and periodically signing statements by Islamic nations denouncing "Armenian aggression," Iran has essentially maintained neutrality in the conflict over Karabakh. Not only has it refused to join the Azerbaijan's and Turkey's economic embargo of Armenia, but it has actually helped the latter to mitigate the adverse affects of these sanctions. "An advanced and developed Armenia will be beneficial to the entire region," Ahmedinejad was reported to tell Sarksyan (Iranian Press TV, April 13).
This stance, seen as "pro-Armenian" by many in Azerbaijan, is at odds with the notion that religion is the main driving force behind Iranian foreign policy. "That does not mean Islam plays no role in Iran's foreign policy," said Arax Pashayan, an Islamic expert at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Armenian National Academy of Sciences. "It is just that in its relations with Armenia, Iran does not use the religious factor and is solely guided by its national interests" (Interview with EDM, April 27). Limiting the Turkish influence in the region has clearly been among those interests -a goal shared by Armenia.
In Armenia, maintaining a warm rapport with its large Muslim neighbor and one of its few commercial conduits to the outside world is a rare issue of national consensus. Armenia's leadership uses every opportunity to praise Iran's "balanced" position on the Karabakh conflict and showcase its support for closer Armenian-Iranian ties. "Armenia attaches special importance to the dynamic expansion of relations with Iran," Sarksyan was quoted by his press office as saying in Tehran on April 13. From Yerevan's perspective, that will also significantly benefit the Armenian energy sector and somewhat offset the country's exclusion from regional energy projects led by either Azerbaijan or Turkey.
Belarus and the Dilemmas of the Eastern Partnership
On May 7 the Eastern Partnership Program (EPP) will be inaugurated at the EU summit in Prague. Belarus has been invited to take part, a decision that has not only angered some EU leaders, but also poses legal and economic dilemmas for all concerned. However, it is still uncertain whether the Belarus' president, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, will attend in person, particularly if he is likely to face public criticism.
Last week, Andrei Sannikou, the international coordinator of Charter 97 and the European Belarus civic movement, stated that on April 14 he had also received an invitation to the Prague summit. However, he will not take part, despite the fact that he supports Belarus' integration into the EU. His reasons were that there are currently three political prisoners languishing in Belarusian jails: Mikalay Autukhovich, Yury Lyavonau, and Uladzimir Asipenka. Belarusians are being forced to emigrate because of continuing political repressions; political parties and NGOs are refused the right to be registered, peaceful demonstrations are dispersed by force, and young activists are being forcibly drafted into the military (www.charter97.org, April 24).
In addition to these comments from a prominent member of the Belarusian opposition, some EU leaders would be very upset to see Lukashenka at the summit. A spokesperson for the Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, stated that the Belarusian leader would not be received at Prague castle, nor would the president greet him personally. Meanwhile, the invitation to Belarus has been acclaimed in Moscow, which perceives the summit as an opportunity to gain a foothold in Europe through its neighbor (www.russiatoday.com, April 21).
Russia is equally aware that there are inherent contradictions in Belarus being a member of both the Eastern Partnership and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc). The latter, formally established in 2000, created a single economic space between its members, with the formation of a free trade zone. In addition to Russia and Belarus, it includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Belarus is also a member of the Russia-Belarus Union, which is arguably a less important body in that its founding Constitution has never been finalized.
In a thoughtful analysis, Darya Sologub noted the potential problems that might develop. The EPP anticipates a free trade zone, but before this can take place, its members must be members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Belarus is not a member of the WTO and has no immediate prospects of acceptance. The EPP stipulates that customs control will function based on the borders of the partnership states. Yet there is currently no official border between Russia and Belarus -indeed upon entering Belarus, visitors are obligated to fill out a customs form of the Russia-Belarus Union. The notion of a visa-free regime critical for many Belarusians -who currently still have to buy EU visas- raises the question of what would happen in the case of Russians entering Belarus, potentially crossing the border into another EPP country. Belarus in theory can take part in European energy security and defense initiatives too, but once again it already has such relationships in place with Russia (www.russiatoday.com. April 27).
One reason for Moscow's support is that its leaders may have gleaned that for Belarus to take part in any meaningful projects, it will require Russia's membership of the EPP. In this respect, Belarus would not be leaving the Russian orbit, but potentially providing a wider swathe of influence for Moscow. In the absence of its Russian partner, Belarus can still gain prestige through the EPP. In particular, a leader and cabinet excluded from European capitals for the past two years could gain new credibility, as long as the demands on Belarus are not too stringent. Lukashenka has reportedly made one private trip to Europe already, and on April 27 he made his first official visit -meeting the Pope in the Vatican. At that meeting he extended an invitation to Benedict XVI to visit Belarus in the near future (Narodnaya Volya, April 27).
As for the EU, its new policy of engagement with Belarus is logical in that isolation achieved very little. But it has also opened the door to some serious legal questions, particularly over where the jurisdiction of the EurAsEc ends and that of the EPP begins. Also, as Sologub highlighted, the financial incentives provided by the EPP may be somewhat limited: Belarus may receive $21 million as opposed to the $11 billion it has already received in loans and credits from Russia (www.russiatoday.com, April 27).
In the meantime, all sides involved in these issues are focusing on the potential benefits, such as Belarus becoming more active on the European stage. But in the longer term, the EPP will have great difficulty in establishing any meaningful integration of the country because of its close ties and commitments to Russia. In mid-April, as part of the agreement for joint air defense, for example, Russia agreed to supply Belarus with the advanced S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft and anti-missile interceptor system (Jane's Defense Weekly, April 17). In short, integration with Russia is proceeding apace alongside the efforts to bring Belarus into the EPP.
--David Marples
Turkey and Armenia's Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan
On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States' diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.
The joint statement read as follows:
"The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified" (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).
Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia's recognition of Turkey's international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).
Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.
Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul's historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama's recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.
However, following Obama's visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan's interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.
The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments' rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.
The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).
Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia's response to Azerbaijan's demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara's earlier statements that it would protect Baku's interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word "genocide" from Obama's April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara's zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).
President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan's interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan's discomfort with these developments is well known.
After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added "The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer" (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).
--Saban Kardas
