| IN THIS ISSUE: * Fighting in Chechnya Continues despite the Counter-Terrorist Operation’s Completion * Death Toll in Ingushetia’s Violence Continues to Mount * Militant Leaders Reportedly Killed in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan * The Cancellation of Counter-Terrorism Operation in Chechnya: Peace or War? By Mairbek Vatchagaev * Ingushetia is Still Burning By Valery Dzutsev Fighting in Chechnya Continues despite the Counter-Terrorist Operation’s Completion Just days after the Russian government announced that it had cancelled the ten-year-old counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya (North Caucasus Weekly, April 17), federal military authorities in the republic announced on April 24 that a new counter-terrorist operation had been launched in three districts of the republic: Shali, Shatoi and Vedeno. “With a view to neutralizing activities of members of illegal armed groups the operational headquarters for the Chechen Republic made a decision to launch on April 23 a counter-terrorist operation in the mountain part of the Shali district, including the settlements Chiri-Urt, Novye Atagi, Serzhen-Yurt and in the whole territory of the Shatoi and Vedeno districts,” Itar-Tass quoted Vladimir Patrin, chief of the joint press center of the Russian federal troops’ operational headquarters for Chechnya, as saying. Two days earlier, on April 22, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) Russian service had reported that Chechen officials had reinstated a special security regime in two of the republic’s southern districts. RFE/RL had reported a day earlier (April 21) that Chechen authorities had launched special operations to locate “hundreds” of resistance fighters in Vedeno. It quoted local law enforcement officials as saying that some 500 rebels led by Dokka Umarov are still active in the Itum-Kala and Vedeno districts and that police were stopping and searching all vehicles and individuals they were encountering in the area. RFE/RL also quoted local authorities as saying that two hideouts with weapons and ammunition, as well as two vacated rebel camps, had been discovered. The news of renewed counter-insurgency activities by both local and federal authorities in Chechnya came amid reports that three Russian Defense Ministry contract servicemen were killed in the village of Bamut in Chechnya’s Achkhoi-Martan district on April 21. Interfax on April 22 quoted a source in the headquarters of the Russian combined federal forces in the North Caucasus as saying that the three servicemen, a sergeant and two privates, were traveling in a tank truck carrying drinking water when unidentified gunmen fired at them, apparently from an abandoned house on the outskirts of the village. The source said that a military patrol arrived at the scene soon after the incident, but that the gunmen had already fled. Reuters on April 22 quoted a spokesman for the Russian security forces in Chechnya as saying that after the three soldiers were shot and killed, their weapons were stolen. The commentator Yulia Latynina reported on Ekho Moskvy radio on April 18 that on the eve of the announcement of the cancellation of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, two members of the Vympel special operations unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), including a high-ranking officer, had been killed in separate explosions in Chechnya. According to Latynina, the federal authorities had not reported the deaths of the Vympel personnel so as not to ruin the celebrations marking the end of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya or possibly delay an announcement that the operation was over. Newsru.com reported on April 21 that the FSB had confirmed the death of one Vympel member in Chechnya and that the slain officer may have been a colonel. Kavkazky Uzel reported on April 17 that a battle had taken place between rebels and the Russian military in the Shatoi district on April 16 as festivities were underway in Grozny marking the end of the counter-terrorist operation. According to the website, the federal forces had used artillery during the clash. Meanwhile, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov continued to paint a rosy picture of the situation in the republic. Interfax on April 21 quoted his press service as denying media reports that the situation in Chechnya’s mountainous districts was worsening, but also as saying that rebel fighters were “preparing to get into Grozny to conduct terrorist acts there.” The presidential press service said the republican branch of the Interior Ministry was continuing to conduct “systematic operations” against militants in the mountains but added that the operations were “routine,” Interfax reported. “The people of Chechnya were inspired by the decision to cancel the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya,” the Chechen presidential press service said. “The people fully support the policy of the government and the republic aimed at rebuilding the economy, the social sphere, the creation of conditions to enable people to live, study and work. We emphasize once again that the bandit groups have been defeated. International terrorists have been destroyed” (see Mairbek Vatchagaev's piece in this issue). Death Toll in Ingushetia’s Violence Continues to Mount The press office of the Federal Security Service (FSB) branch in Ingushetia told Itar-Tass on April 21 that an anti-terrorist operation in and around the village of Verkhny Alkun in Ingushetia’s Sunzha district had been completed. According to the office, a base under construction by gunmen and a ward for “keeping hostages” were discovered in a forest during the operation, which had been launched on April 20 due to the information that several gunmen were staying in Verkhny Alkun. Yet, no gunmen were found during the operation. Also on April 21, a member of an “illegal armed gang” who had targeted law enforcement officers in Ingushetia was shot dead in the republic’s Nazran district, RIA Novosti reported. “Law enforcers had information that militants involved in attacks ... traveled in a black Lada Priora car without a license plate,” a local Federal Security Service spokesman told the news agency. The FSB spokesman said that after the car was spotted, officers ordered the driver to stop, but he opened fire and was killed in the ensuing shootout. Reporting on the same incident, Itar-Tass reported on April 21 that a column of vehicles belonging to the Ingush branch of the FSB was fired on from another vehicle that day on the Surkhasi-Ekazhevo road, after which the attacking vehicle was blocked and an “illegal armed formation” member inside the car was killed. According to the news agency, the slain alleged militant turned out to be Adam Aushev, a 22-year-old Surkhasi resident and younger brother of Magomed Aushev, who was killed during a security sweep in the village of Barsuki in Ingushetia’s Nazran district in December 2008. Yet, the independent Ingushetia.org website quoted relatives of Adam Aushev as saying that while driving out of Surkhasi he had been stopped by police, who asked him to buy cigarettes for them and bring them upon his return to the village, but that when he returned ten minutes later, his car was blocked by an armored personnel carrier that opened fire at point blank range, killing him. According to Ingushetia.org, law enforcement personnel then planted an automatic weapon in his car. In a report to Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, security forces claimed that Aushev had ignored a demand to stop his car and had shot at them. They also claimed that he had been involved in the reported attack on the FSB column on the Surkhasi-Ekazhevo road earlier in the day. On April 19, an Islamic cleric was killed when unknown assailants opened fire on his house in Nazran, RIA Novosti reported. The news agency quoted a police source as saying that gunmen attacked the home of the 38-year-old cleric, Musa Ezmurziev, in the center of Nazran, using grenade launchers and automatic rifles, and that Ezmurziev died on the spot from gunshot wounds. The attackers escaped. Also on April 19, unknown gunmen opened fire on the house of the chief of the criminal police in Ingushetia’s Sunzha district, killing his sister and injuring his brother, RIA Novosti quoted a local police source as saying. In an item on the same incident, Itar-Tass reported on April 20 that the chief of the Sunzha district criminal police department, Alikhan Geroyev, had been wounded in a shootout. The news agency quoted the Investigative Committee as saying that unknown gunmen opened fire on Geroyev’s house on Lenin Street in the Ordzhonikidzevskaya settlement with a Shmel grenade launcher, lightly wounding Geroyev and also wounding his brother and sister. Police reported that Geroyev’s 32-year-old sister later died of her wounds. Also in Nazran on April 19, a 77-year-old resident, Saipudin Magushkov, was hospitalized with gunshot wounds after he was shot by unidentified attackers firing automatic weapons. Interfax quoted a republican Interior Ministry source as saying that Magushkov had once worked as the head of security for Ingushetia’s central hospital but was now retired, and that he may have been targeted because he has relatives who work in law enforcement. Itar-Tass reported on April 19 that a traffic police officer shot near the village of Ekazhevo village in Ingushetia’s Nazran district had died from his wounds in the hospital. The 24-year-old policeman, Adam Balkoev, was shot from a passing vehicle on April 18. The BBC reported on April 17 that nearly 50 people died in Ingushetia in fighting with local militants between January and March, officials say. Citing police casualty figures, it reported that 27 rebels, 18 policemen and two civilians were killed in gun and bomb attacks that also wounded 44 people. Euronews on April 16 quoted Oleg Orlov, head of the Memorial human rights group, as saying that the level of violence has gone down in Chechnya but that violence has spread to Dagestan and Ingushetia. “There has been a catastrophic growth of mutual violence between militants and law enforcement troops in recent years and it is the civilian population that suffers most,” Orlov said. Meanwhile, Ingushetia’s president, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, said on April 18 that ending the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was the “right decision” and that it will have a positive effect on all of southern Russia, Interfax reported. The federal authorities have “made it clear to international terrorists that Russia has enough forces and funds to stop illegal terrorist activities, no matter where they are coming from,” Yevkurov said, adding that there are sufficient forces in the republic from the interior ministry’s internal troops, other interior ministry units and law enforcement agencies to facilitate “the implementation of tasks aimed at preventing terrorists actions.” According to Interfax, Yevkurov said that the federal Interior Ministry group temporarily deployed in Ingushetia is giving “strong support” to the republic’s Interior Ministry. He also said that the republican authorities are actively working with the relatives of “those who have not yet come to their senses and are hiding in the forest with weapons and who have been convicted for serious terrorist crimes and are in prison.” He added that this work should have “a positive effect on those who have not laid down their arms” by helping them “come to their senses and draw the corresponding right conclusions, stop putting up resistance to the bodies of state power and return to peaceful life” (see Valery Dzutsev’s piece in this issue). Militant Leaders Reportedly Killed in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan Citing the public relations center of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Itar-Tass reported on April 24 that the “leader of a local gang” in Kabardino-Balkaria, Zeitun Sultanov, had been killed along with an accomplice during a joint special operation conducted by the FSB and the interior ministry. According to the FSB, the special operation was conducted in the village of Khasanya, near Kabardino-Balkaria’s capital, Nalchik, and targeted both Sultanov, who was allegedly involved in a series of terrorist acts in Kabardino-Balkaria, and his accomplice, Alim Boziev. They offered armed resistance and “were destroyed in a shootout,” the FSB said. According to the FSB, Sultanov had been a member of the Yarmuk “terrorist formation” since 2002 and maintained “close contacts” with the late rebel field commanders Shamil Basaev and Khattab. “In 2005, he formed his own gang engaged in committing murders of law enforcers and acts of terrorism in Kabardino-Balkaria,” the FSB said of Sultanov, adding that after the “gang leader” Rustam Mameyev was killed in Khasanya in October 2008, Sultanov took over coordinating the activities of “terrorist groups” in “a considerable part of the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria” and maintained contacts with “gang leaders” in Ingushetia, Chechnya, Dagestan, North Ossetia and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. The FSB also claimed that “emissaries of international terrorist organizations” assisted Sultanov and “regularly received video reports on the activity of gangs from him.” The FSB also alleged that Sultanov and his “gang” committed a number of serious crimes over the period 2006-2008, including the murders of the chief of police of Kabardino-Balkaria’s Chereksky district, Colonel Mustafa Konakov (Chechnya Weekly, September 15, 2006), and the head of Kabardino-Balkaria’s regional anti-organized crime directorate Colonel Anatoly Kyarov and his driver, Lieutenant Albert Rakhaev (Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 14, 2008). According to the FSB, they also organized the murder of nine hunters and forest rangers near the village of Lechinkai in 2007 (Chechnya Weekly, November 8 and 21, 2007) and planned and carried out more than 20 armed attacks on interior troops officers on the outskirts of the village of Khasanya. RIA Novosti reported on April 23 that two people were killed when a car exploded in Nalchik. According to Kabardino-Balkaria’s emergency services, the car blew up in a village not far from Nalchik and two dead bodies were discovered in the vehicle after the subsequent blaze had been extinguished. The cause of the blast and the identities of the two victims have yet to be determined, RIA Novosti reported. Meanwhile, RIA Novosti reported on April 24 that police in Dagestan shot dead a militant group leader suspected of numerous attacks on law enforcement officers. A police spokesman told the news agency that Zakir Navruzov, who was on the federal wanted list, was surrounded by police in a house in the town of Derbent, and that he opened fire when ordered to surrender. According to the police spokesman, Navruzov was killed in the return fire, and none of the police officers were wounded. RIA Novosti noted that the report of Navruzov’s death was the second in seven months, with police having claimed to have killed him last September. The news agency also reported that Navruzov was known to have been an accomplice of Ilgar Malachiev, the Dagestani insurgent leader killed in a clash with security forces last September (North Caucasus Weekly, September 19, 2008). Also on April 24, an officer from the police department of Makhachkala’s Kirov district was murdered, Itar-Tass reported. “The body of the policeman with a bullet wound in the head was found on the territory of a service center” in the capital late on April 23, the Dagestani Interior Ministry’s press service told the news agency. Also late on April 23, police in Makhachkala stopped a car for a document check, after which the driver got out of the car and ran away. While searching the vehicle, police found two submachine-guns, an F-1 grenade, five submachine-gun magazines and 150 5.45 mm cartridges. A search for the car’s owner was underway, Itar-Tass reported. Former Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov said earlier this month that the number of militant attacks on law enforcement personnel and civilians in Dagestan increased by 40 percent in 2008 in comparison with 2007. The Cancellation of Counter-Terrorism Operation in Chechnya: Peace or War? By Mairbek Vatchagaev The Russian authorities have been trying to present the cancellation of the counter-terrorist operation as a victory over unruly Chechnya (Interfax, April 16). Yet, some 18 years have passed since the Chechen people declared independence from Moscow in 1991. This small North Caucasian republic was the first to take advantage of the USSR law No.1457-I, signed by the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on April 26, 1990 (Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnikh Deputatov SSSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, M., 1990, No.19, pp.429-433). That law made the rights of autonomous regions within the Russian Federation equal to those of the Soviet republics, thereby taking them out from under the control of Russia and making them ostensibly independent entities. As the USSR was breaking up, on November 1, 1991, the then Chechen President Djokhar Dudaev declared the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic and from that moment onward all Russian mechanisms of administration on the territory of Chechnya ceased to function. The anti-terrorist operation introduced in Chechnya in October 1999 continued the following years without interruption. The first time that Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov voiced the possibility of abolition was after a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in which Kadyrov declared that an announcement will soon be made “on victory over gangsterism in Chechnya” (Newsru.com, March 25). (This once again showed that the person who makes the decisions about Chechnya is not the nominal president of Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, but Putin.) Three weeks later the decision about the abolition of the counter-terrorist operation was adopted at the highest level. Kadyrov made a grandiose show out of the abolition of the counter-terrorist operation—religious ceremonies were held across the republic, celebratory demonstrations were organized to praise Putin and Kadyrov—and it was proposed that the date of the announcement be declared an annual nationwide holiday. With no compunction at exaggerating his assessments, Kadyrov proclaimed the end of the counter-terrorist operation “a triumph of victory of policy” carried out by Putin in the Caucasus (http://asfera.info/news/one-24257.html). The abolition of the counter-terrorist operation in the republic will open a customs service in the republic. Kadyrov has repeatedly talked about the necessity of its existence. Undoubtedly, Moscow will appoint the head of a service of such strategic importance, but even that fades against the backdrop of the revenues that the Chechen leadership anticipates from this venture. It will allow the Chechen authorities to stop cooperation with the customs of neighboring regions, where corruption is skyrocketing. Similar in importance is the granting of international status to the Grozny Airport, which will allow the Chechens to make direct trips abroad not via Moscow or the airports of neighboring republics. This will be a breath of fresh air for Kadyrov, who aspires to travel to the Middle East from his own airport. The abolition of the counter-terrorist operation implies that Kadyrov's plans will be drawn to withdraw a portion of the troops from the territory of Chechnya. First of all, this has to do with the troops of the federal Interior Ministry that have been deployed in the republic on a temporary basis. Since nobody really knows how many of them are in Chechnya, it cannot be ruled out that figures will be cited without corresponding evidence of who was withdrawn where and when. Few people will know the relevant details. It is only possible to conjecture that the withdrawal will affect tens of thousands of servicemen summoned from all territories and regions of the Russian Federation—from Khabarovsk to Murmansk. In either case, the withdrawal of two combat brigades—the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Defense Ministry and the 46th Separate Operational Purpose Brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry, which have been deployed in the republic on a permanent basis—will be out of the question (Newsru.com, April 16). Nothing is mentioned about the special detachments of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), or border troops or detachments used for the maintenance and servicing of armored equipment in the territories adjacent to Chechnya. For instance, one of the large military bases in the south of Russia is in Mozdok, which is located on the territory of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania but serves the exclusive needs of the Russian military deployed in Chechnya. An equally important factor in the abolition of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya will be the theoretical possibility of opening access to the republic to journalists and non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that since the start of military operations in the republic, Chechnya has been closed off to such visits. At present any independent journalist wishing to visit Chechnya needs not only official accreditation in Russia, but also two additional permits from the federal Interior Ministry and the FSB, which limit the visit to a pre-approved itinerary (The Guardian, February 23). If there is the slightest deviation from the approved route, the journalist’s accreditation in the zone of military operations is annulled and he or she is escorted from the territory of Chechnya (http://www.canadets.com/news/20089.html). For ordinary citizens of Chechnya the formal abolition of the counter-terrorist operation will change very little. The truth is that while the operation may be abolished across the republic, it is likely to remain in effect in the mountainous part of Chechnya. Most likely the counter-terrorist operation there will be implemented as needed in accordance with an operational plan of strikes against members of the armed resistance (http://www.grani.ru/War/Chechnya/m.150015.html). When the cancellation of the counter-terrorist operation was announced, an armed clash with militants took place in the mountainous part of Chechnya near the village of Dai. One of the militants who participated in that clash informed the North Caucasian service of Radio Liberty about the incident, which also indicates that the militants are now more actively using phones than before. Another confirmation of this shift was a series of recent phone interviews given by different members of the armed resistance in Chechnya to the independent reporting agency Prague Watchdog (located in the Czech Republic). In these interviews, the militants said that they intend to launch active operations against the enemy (meaning Russian servicemen and Moscow appointees in Chechnya) in the near future. One of the most recent interviews is with field commander Abdul-Malik, from the detachments deployed in the Vedeno District, who assessed the ending of the counter-terrorist operation negatively and said he considers it a fiction. Abdul-Malik is 30-year-old, and returned to Chechnya from Austria. He thinks that there are many people like him and that he would not be able to carry out the fight and to resist the Russian army without popular support (http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000005-000004-000173&lang=2). Kadyrov has again disputed the figures cited by the Russian special services that put the number of militants in Chechnya at 480. Kadyrov claims that the militants number less than 70 (http://www.newsru.com/russia/25mar2009/defeated.html). Even the members of the armed opposition do not know exactly how many militants are operating in Chechnya, but in any case it is unlikely that they can be counted in the dozens and it is more plausible to speak of hundreds of active militants, without counting those in the population who support them in the villages and towns. Against this backdrop Chechens will have to hear about the counter-terrorist operation in their republic for some time to come. Adopting an optimistic outlook regarding the end of the military operation in the republic is probably a losing proposition. Not only are there members of the armed opposition in Chechnya, but also an ideology that is shared by many of the republic’s youth. Constant references by Western journalists and Russian pseudo-patriots to the supposed fact that Kadyrov has received independence that the separatists could only dream of do not correspond with the reality on the ground. Kadyrov enjoys what Moscow allows him to enjoy and it is anybody’s guess what Moscow will apportion for him tomorrow. All references to Kadyrov’s alleged departure from Moscow’s sphere of influence or his supposed achievement of independence are nothing more than wholesale demagoguery—a public relations campaign—by politicians in the Kremlin, who managed to create the facade of independence while skillfully concealing all the levers they use to control Kadyrov. Dr. Mairbek Vatchagaev is the author of the book, "Chechnya in the 19th Century Caucasian Wars." Ingushetia is Still Burning By Valery Dzutsev Nearly six months after Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was appointed the new president in volatile Ingushetia, the violence in the republic has shown few signs of abating. “During the two days that I stayed in Ingushetia recently, ten attacks took place in the republic, including an attack on [Russian] border guards and others,” said Ingushetia’s first president, Ruslan Aushev, in an interview with Echo Moskvy radio station on April 21. The calculus of Moscow's move to replace Murat Zyazikov with Yevkurov last October was to improve the security situation in the republic, which had been plagued by hostilities for several years. Yet, the patterns of violence have continued largely unchanged: radicals that are often thought of as Islamists attack police, Russian military forces and occasionally people who act contrary to the stringent Islamic norms in Ingushetia. In turn, the Russian security forces and local police engage in equally violent attacks on the insurgents, including large-scale mopping-up operations in Ingush towns and villages. The government forces rarely catch the radicals; rather, the police and security forces habitually kill them on the spot—without bringing the suspects in for trial. Human rights activists argue that this practice often victimizes innocent people and further radicalizes younger generation. In a region where blood vengeance is still a widespread custom, this warning has very substantial grounds. On April 21, another young man, Adam Aushev, was killed after he reportedly refused to stop his car at the entrance to his home village Surkhakhi. The Ingushetia.org website quoted the republic’s Interior Minister as saying that Aushev was innocent (Ingushetia.org, April 21). The new president of Ingushetia has been trying to distance himself from the practices of his unpopular predecessor by employing some members of the former opposition, endorsing the investigation into the strange death of the prominent opposition leader Magomed Yevloev, owner of the website Ingushetia.org, and allowing the prosecution of former Ingush officials on corruption charges. On April 3, the lawyer Kaloi Akhilgov unexpectedly became Yevkurov’s spokesman (Ingushetia.org, April 4). The investigation of Yevloev’s death intensified after Yevkurov came to power. Yevloev was detained by the Ingush police on his arrival from Moscow on August 31 last year, shot in the head a few hours later and subsequently died in the hospital. The opposition believes that the police killed him in cold blood, while the police claim it was an accident. The large-scale corruption in the previous administration started to emerge only after Zyazikov vacated his post. Since December of last year, reports of former Ingush administration bureaucrats being charged with corruption-related crimes have multiplied: tens of millions of dollars are thought to have been stolen and dozens of officials are suspected of having participated in the illegal schemes (Kavkazky Uzel, March 5). Yet, as president of Ingushetia, Yevkurov's most significant success came in peacemaking. Yevkurov brokered peace agreements between forty-seven Ingush families that had ongoing blood feuds. In a traditional society like the one in Ingushetia, this is an unprecedented achievement. The move also perhaps indicates the changing nature of Ingush traditions (Interfax, April 18). In his interview with Echo Moskvy, Aushev blamed the federal authorities for being inattentive to the people’s needs and instead trying to solve existing problems solely with force. Referring to the Islamic extremists in Ingushetia, Aushev said: “These people have their ideas that drive them to violence and they should be confronted with ideas too, not only violence.” Aushev accused Yevkurov’s views as being in line with the Russian security services and his predecessor Zyazikov, that is, the belief that the root cause of violence in Ingushetia is foreign powers using the Islamists “to disintegrate Russia” (Novaya Gazeta, February 9). Most importantly, Aushev, who is known for being a very independent politician, stated that popular elections for the republican president should be restored. This topic has been a thorn in the Kremlin’s side since the elections were abolished in 2004 on the grounds of “improving the state ability to fight terrorism” and strengthening of the mysterious “power vertical.” In the current economic situation, with Moscow no longer enjoying a continual inflow of petrodollars and projected to have increasingly fewer resources, regional voices have become stronger in demanding greater autonomy from the federal government. Aushev believes specifically that national republics in particular, as opposed to the predominantly ethnic Russian regions, need to have free elections in order to stay stable. The instability of Ingushetia stands in stark contrast to the situation next door in Chechnya. The security situation in once war-torn and destroyed Chechnya has improved so much that Moscow formally ended the ten-year-old counterinsurgency operation there on April 16 (Vesti TV, April 16). Human rights organizations have shed some light on how the relative stability in Chechnya was achieved. Human Rights Watch reported that the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has vigorously pursued a campaign against the relatives of known insurgents. The pressure on relatives has included verbal threats as well as physical attacks, in particular, the practice of setting the houses of suspects’ relatives ablaze (Radio Liberty, April 13). This practice is reminiscent of the tactic that Russian colonizers used against North Caucasians throughout the 19th century. The question looms whether Moscow would like to see the type of stability that now exists in Chechnya everywhere in the North Caucasus, where it cannot control the situation by administrative means, or is satisfied with having Chechnya as a scary example and hopes to use it to ward off large-scale instability in other regions of the North Caucasus. So far it appears to have had little effect on Ingushetia. Valery Dzutsev is a Muskie Fellow at the University of Maryland and the former Coordinator for North Caucasus at the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) in 2002-2007. |
