| IN THIS ISSUE: * Counter-Terrorist Operation in Chechnya Officially Ended * Decision to Revive Akhmad Kadyrov Murder Probe Overturned * Dubai Police Chief Reiterates Accusations against Adam Delimkhanov * The Mysterious Assassination of Sulim Yamadaev By Mairbek Vatchagaev * Youth Activists Unravel Kremlin Status-Quo in the Circassian Heartland: “The Wind of Freedom is Approaching!” By Fatima Tlisova Counter-Terrorist Operation in Chechnya Officially Ended In yet another apparent victory for Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin announced on April 16 that the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was over, marking an official end to the second Chechen war that began in September 1999 (North Caucasus Weekly, April 3). As the Moscow Times reported on April 17, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev instructed the National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NAK), headed by Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Aleksandr Bortnikov, to end the security regime from midnight on April 16. “This decision aims to create conditions to further normalize the situation in the region and to restore and develop its economic and social infrastructure,” the NAK said in a statement, Itar-Tass reported. Kadyrov said he received the news that the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was over “with great satisfaction,” adding that the “most important thing is that the lifting of the operation has been dictated by the fulfillment of the tasks to fight terrorism that were set 10 years ago,” Interfax reported on April 16. “Now the Chechen Republic—as thousands of guests acknowledge, including politicians, businessmen, journalists and cultural figures that visit the region—is a peaceful, developing territory, and cancelling the counter-terrorism operation will only promote economic growth in the republic.” Kadyrov also told Interfax that the decision would be greeted by businesspeople in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Asia who wanted to invest in Chechnya’s economy but had been hesitant to do so because of restrictions related to the counter-terrorist operation. He added that “without waiting for the decision to be taken” by the federal authorities to end the operation, “a customs post has been built [in Chechnya] at a rapid pace and a number of measures have been undertaken to give the [Grozny] airport international status.” Kadyrov said that ending the counter-terrorist operation also has “enormous moral and psychological significance,” because in doing so, Russia’s leadership “has officially confirmed the fact that the nest of terrorism has been crushed, that illegal armed groups have been neutralized, and militant leaders on whose conscience lay the grief and suffering of thousands of people have been destroyed, detained and brought to court.” He added that he hoped that the decision would facilitate “the return home of those who left Russia” during the ten years that the counter-terrorist operation was in effect. Kadyrov said that Russian troops would have to stay in Chechnya “not because we still have the threat of banditry and terrorism, but in case of an outside threat,” Itar-Tass reported on April 16. “We have to protect the Caucasus in particular and thus Russia in general. Remember South Ossetia. As for internal problems, the republic’s law-enforcement bodies are coping excellently.” RIA Novosti on April 17 quoted Kadyrov as saying that the day the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya ended, April 16, would be designated as an official holiday in the republic. “This day is for us historic,” Kadyrov said, speaking in his native village of Tsentoroi. “We will be marking it every year as a holiday. I am also sure that it is significant for every Russian.” Kadyrov said that the decision to end the counter-terrorism operation confirmed that Chechnya is the most secure of Russia’s regions. He said that Chechens had protected Russia’s sovereignty and will continue to protect the interests of the state. In 2003, despite pressure from the West, “Chechens made their choice and declared that they would develop together with the fraternal peoples of Russia,” he said. “I believe that choice is worth a lot.” Kadyrov added that during the ten years of the counter-terrorist operation, his clan lost 420 people. “I lost the people dearest to me, including my father,” he said. Meanwhile, Newsru.com reported on April 17 that the Chechen authorities plan to give the Grozny Airport international status and begin flights to Kazakhstan, Turkey and the Middle East. Sultan Satuev, the general director of the state company Vainakhavia, which runs Grozny Airport, was quoted as saying that negotiations are already underway to give the airport international status, given that the main requirement to do so—ending the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya—has now been fulfilled. He said, however, that reconstruction of the airport’s infrastructure needed for it to meet international standards would take a month. Satuev said that Chechen government officials are currently in Moscow with the required documentation and meeting with officials from Rosaviatsia and the Russian Transport Ministry. A source in the Federal Customs Service was quoted as saying that there are not yet the proper conditions for setting up customs control areas at the Grozny Airport, adding that first the airport must receive international status. Satuev said most of the international flights from the airport would be traveling to Kazakhstan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, which have the largest expatriate Chechen populations. Ziad Sabsabi, Chechnya’s representative in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia’s parliament, said he expected the airport would also have flights to Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. The reaction in Moscow to news of the end of the counter-terrorist operation Chechnya was mixed. The Moscow Times on April 17 quoted Viktor Ilyukhin, a Communist State Duma deputy and former member of the parliament's security committee, as saying that the Kremlin’s decision was necessary but that he was worried about its political implications. “On the one hand it is unavoidable because [the security regime] greatly hampers the republic’s development,” he said. “On the other hand I do not have full trust in Kadyrov. Who can guarantee that no rebels will descend from the mountains after the troops have gone?” Another Communist Party legislator, State Duma Deputy Speaker Ivan Melnikov, said that in lifting the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya the federal authorities were “acting at their own risk and peril.” He warned that upswings in rebel activity were possible given deteriorating social and economic conditions, RIA Novosti reported on April 16. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky said the decision was a mistake given the threat that “terrorist acts” in Chechnya will resume, Interfax reported on April 16. “If we leave now, rebels will return and there will be a fight for power again,” he said. “It is not just that many in Chechnya possess weapons and therefore clans will be settling scores there. Foreign special services—those from Turkey, Arab and Western nations—are always there.” Other members of Russia’s parliament backed the decision to end the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, including Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, who called it “justified and well-founded.” He warned against “getting too relaxed,” however, given that Russia’s financial and economic crisis is increasing tensions, “and not only in the North Caucasus,” Interfax reported. Gennady Gudkov, deputy of the State Duma’s Security Committee and a member of the parliament’s pro-Kremlin A Just Russia faction, called the decision “logical” given that the situation in Chechnya is, in his words, “not worse” and in some respects “even better than in other ethnic republics,” Interfax reported. He said that lifting the counter-terrorist regime means there will be fewer restrictions on the daily lives of Chechnya’s inhabitants. The military’s job, he added, is being taken over by the special services, which should “continue carrying out precision-targeted actions to deal with what remains of bandit detachments” using relatively small special-purpose units. Gudkov, a former KGB officer, said that the FSB should have a “special coordinating center” to oversee the activities of such special-purpose units aimed at preventing rebels from “spreading across the region.” Interfax on April 16 quoted Lev Ponomarev, the veteran human rights activist who heads the For Human Rights movement, as saying that ending the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was, on the one hand, good given that citizens’ rights are violated during such an operation and the activities of the security agencies are not monitored. On the other hand, the withdrawal of federal forces from the republic will mean that “no one will keep Chechnya’s security agencies in check,” Ponomarev said, adding: “There were federal troops and local security agencies in Chechnya. These were levers which somehow kept each other in check. We know that in Chechnya, as before, human rights are being grossly violated. I do not think that the situation will now improve.” Tatyana Lokshina, a researcher for Human Right Watch, said that lifting customs restriction on Chechnya and conferring international status on the Grozny Airport were especially important to Kadyrov given that the State Duma has cut federal subsidies to the republic by almost 30 percent. More generally, she said that the lifting of the counter-terrorist regime in Chechnya has highlighted the main tendency in relations between Chechnya and the Kremlin. “The Kremlin always sooner or later caves into Kadyrov’s demands,” she said, adding that while a series of scandals surrounding Kadyrov—an apparent reference to the murder of a number of his opponents—had made authorities in Moscow wary of giving him free rein, they had done so in the end. On the other hand, Lokshina said that all restrictions on foreign media working in the republic should now be lifted and that the authorities as well as security agencies operating in the republic will now have to justify their actions on the basis of the law, not on the basis of a special counter-terrorist regime. Chechnya’s press minister, Shasail Saraliev, told Ekho Moskvy radio on April 16 that with the lifting of the counter-terrorist regime in Chechnya, restrictions on journalists working there would also be lifted “automatically.” Saraliev said that journalists will now be able to work in Chechnya the way they work in other Russian regions. “There will be no difference from other regions,” he said. “We have an open region.” Saraliev clarified, however, that he was talking only about Russian journalists, not foreign journalists. In addition, Itar-Tass on April 16 quoted Southern Federal District law-enforcement sources as saying that the counter-terrorist operation would remain in effect in some of Chechnya’s mountainous districts where there is “a high probability of attacks” by militants. The sources said this could be the case in 10 mountainous districts. The commander of the federal Interior Ministry’s internal troops, Nikolai Rogozhkin, said earlier that 20,000 internal troops would be pulled out of the republic once the counter-terrorist regime was ended, and Kavkazky Uzel on April 16 quoted a federal Interior Ministry statement as saying that the ministry would start withdrawing these troops “without delay.” Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Center for Strategic Studies, told Polit.ru on April 16 that despite Kadyrov’s demonstration of personal loyalty to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the lifting of the counter-terrorist regime in Chechnya was a “big victory for Kadyrov” demonstrating that the republic has become de facto independent. “Over the course of two weeks, Kadyrov managed to mobilize political resources that proved to be more effective than the resources of our power ministries,” he told the website. “This once again underscores that Chechnya has become de facto independent under Kadyrov’s formal articulation of loyalty not so much to Moscow as to Putin personally, as he [Kadyrov] always emphasizes.” This raises a distressing question, Piontkovsky added: what was the point of the two counter-terrorist operations aimed at “establishing constitutional order” conducted under both Putin and his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, during which 10,000 Russian soldiers and around 100,000 Chechen civilians were killed? “It would have been possible to agree easily on the status of Chechnya that we now have with Kadyrov with much more decent people like the Soviet [military] officers [Djokhar] Dudaev and [Aslan] Maskhadov,” Piontkovsky said. The ending of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya means that federal Interior Ministry forces will be withdrawn from the republic and federal forces will no longer be able to “run riot” there, Piontkovsky said. The federal siloviki, he added, wanted the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya to continue because of the revenues it brought them through federal funding for the operation, as well as the “plundering” they engaged in there and the oil revenues that Kadyrov was forced to share with them. Piontkovsky said that many people in neighboring republics such as Ingushetia and Dagestan will now be asking: “And why can’t our president protect us from the federals’ outrages, when Ramzan Akhmatovich Kadyrov has done it so effectively?” Gazeta.ru on April 16 quoted the president of Ingushetia, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, as saying that the end of the counter-terrorist regime in Chechnya would not impact the work of Ingushetia’s law-enforcement bodies along the administrative border between the two republics. “The posts which stand along the border will remain, but there will be no additional reinforcement,” he said. “If there is operational information indicating that reinforcement is needed, then we will react.” Meanwhile, RIA Novosti reported on April 17 that a group of federal Interior Ministry internal troops fought with a group of militants in Chechnya’s Shatoi district. The news agency reported that there were no casualties among the federal forces, who fired artillery at the rebels. Decision to Revive Akhmad Kadyrov Murder Probe Overturned The investigation committee of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office on April 16 overruled a decision by one of its subdivisions to resume a probe into the May 2004 assassination of then Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, father of the republic’s current president. As RIA Novosti reported, the investigation committee of the Southern Federal District Prosecutor’s Office had announced earlier in the day that it had resumed a probe into the May 9 explosion that killed the elder Kadyrov during a Victory Parade marking the end of World War Two at the Chechen capital’s Dinamo Stadium. The decision to reopen the investigation “was declared groundless and premature, and was revoked,” the investigation committee of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office said in an April 16 statement. As RIA Novosti noted, the probe was resumed at the request of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, who said last week he was “70 percent” certain that Sulim Yamadaev, the former Vostok special operations battalion commander who was murdered in Dubai on March 28, had played a role in his father’s assassination. Kadyrov also claimed that Yamadaev plotted to kill him on the day he was inaugurated as Chechnya’s president, February 15, 2007, by poisoning a lake at his residence. The announcement by the investigation committee of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office that it had revoked the decision by its Southern Federal District branch to reopen the Akhmad Kadyrov murder investigation suggests that there may still be some resistance at the upper reaches of federal power to the policy of giving Kadyrov free rein in Chechnya. Dubai Police Chief Reiterates Accusations against Adam Delimkhanov The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) newspaper The National quoted an anonymous senior official for the Dubai Police Criminal Investigations Department as saying that the gold-plated gun used to assassinate the former Vostok special operations battalion commander on March 28 is believed to have been smuggled into Dubai under a diplomatic visa. The source told the newspaper that the Makarov PM 9mm gun is believed to have been smuggled inside the luggage of a Russian official on a diplomatic trip to Dubai that was not checked by customs staff due to the officials diplomatic status. “When a diplomat comes in the country, do you search him?” the source said. “Of course not, and in this case this is how they smuggled the gun into the country.” Meanwhile, the chief of the Dubai police, Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, stood by his claims that Adam Delimkhanov, who is Ramzan Kadyrov’s cousin, a member of Russia’s Statue Duma and a former deputy prime minister of Chechnya, masterminded Yamadaev’s assassination. According to The National, Lieutenant General Tamim said during a television interview on April 9 that he had “strong and solid” evidence that proved the involvement of the five others suspects in the case and, in the newspaper’s words, that also “indicated” the gun used to kill Yamadaev was brought into Dubai through diplomatic links. Tamim called on Russian officials to hand over the suspects to the Dubai police—although, as The National noted, the Russian government previously said it would not hand over Delimkhanov to Dubai. “Delimkhanov is officially wanted by Interpol and we will do our best to get him,” Tamim was quoted as saying. “Today he is in power but tomorrow he will be out of it and the request for his arrest will still be listed. He can end this situation by turning himself in to the Russian authorities for investigation.” Tamim said the police had been able to get confessions from the Iranian and Tajik suspects being held in connection with the murder, and that they had provided more than just “ordinary confessions.” He added: “The Russians are capable of controlling the situation. It’s completely unacceptable to leave the Chechen gangsters to carry on their crimes in more than one country and wage conflict on someone else’s country.” Earlier, Tamim rejected the claim by Andrei Lugovoi, the Russian State Duma deputy wanted by British authorities in connection with the radioactive poisoning murder of former Russian special services officer Aleksandr Litvinenko, that the Dubai police was playing “political games” in seeking Delimkhanov’s extradition (North Caucasus Weekly, April 10). “We would not accuse anyone of their involvement in the case unless we had concrete and substantial evidence linking all those accused to the crime,” The National on April 8 quoted the Dubai police chief as saying. “Otherwise, we would not have released details of the case and announced the involvement of a specific individual and place him on our wanted list.” Tamin also responded to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s denunciation of the Dubai police’s charges against Delimkhanov, saying: “If the Chechen president doubts our investigation results then I suggest that an international team of investigators come and examine the findings.” Gulfnews.com reported on April 10 that in the same television interview, Tamim repeated his insistence that Yamadaev died immediately at the scene of the attack and was not alive, as some media and relatives of Yamadaev have claimed. He also denied that Yamadaev had earlier informed the Dubai police that he was being watched or asked for police protection. “He arranged for his own security and we only knew about the clashes and conflicts he was involved in from the Russian media following his assassination,” the website quoted Tamim as saying. According to Gulfnews.com, new information revealed that Yamadaev was shot with two bullets, the first of which missed him while the second hit him in the back of the neck, killing him instantly. In addition, one of Yamadaev’s two Arab bodyguards was struck in the head with the butt of a gun during the attack. After the shooting, the assassin ran out of the parking lot carrying a luggage, threw his black gloves on the side road and got rid of the bag with the gun, after which he went to the beach, where he took off his shirt and then got into a waiting car. The assassin left Dubai six hours after the crime, the website reported. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on April 10 that Russia is still waiting for information from the UAE on the killing of Sulim Yamadaev, RIA Novosti reported. Speaking to reporters on a flight from Turkmenistan to Moscow, Lavrov said Russia is waiting to receive “any kind of official report” on the murder from the UAE. “We are counting on our partners in the Emirates do this quickly,” Lavrov said. “The official channel for such cases is the embassy. However, nothing had been received as of the day I left Moscow [Thursday, April 9].” The Mysterious Assassination of Sulim Yamadaev By Mairbek Vatchagaev On the evening of March 28, the Chechen community in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—which is approximately 2,000-3,000 strong—was abuzz with the news of the assassination attempt on Sulim Yamadaev (http://chechen.org/forums/showthread.php?t=41&page=63). Closer to midnight, the mass media, citing the Reuters news agency, began to talk about the assassination of a Chechen named Madov Suleiman in Dubai, the capital of UAE (http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2009/03/28/n_1346238.shtml). The seriousness of the incident was underscored by the fact that the crime scene was visited by the chief of the Dubai police, General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, and the director of the State Security Service, General Khamis Mattar Al Mazienah. By the morning of March 29, few in the Chechen community of UAE doubted that it was Sulim Yamadaev who was killed. It should be noted that he relocated to the UAE only several months ago under an assumed identity (and with a fake passport) with his entire family (including his wife and children). According to local Chechens, he lived inconspicuously and tried not to attract attention. The very fact of a fake passport indicated that his departure to the Emirates was an operation aimed at protecting him from possible enemies. Yet, the selection of UAE, where several thousand Chechens reside, apparently was not the best option for saving him and his family from revenge. By a confluence of circumstances, the enemies of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s hand-picked favorite usually do not live long lives, regardless of where they reside or under whose protection. On November 18, 2006, Movladi Baisarov, the head of the “Gorets” (Highlander) special operations detachment and fierce opponent of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, was gunned down in downtown Moscow (http://lenta.ru/news/2006/11/18/killed/). On January 13 of this year, Umar Israilov, who had filed a claim against Kadyrov with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, was killed in Vienna, Austria (www.infox.ru/accident/crime/2009/01/28/V_Vyenye_zadyerzhany_print.phtml). Apart from the aforementioned individuals, who were Kadyrov’s personal enemies, over the course of the past several months (from the fall of 2008 to early 2009), a similar fate met three Chechens in Istanbul, Turkey, including the cousin of the leader of Chechen resistance movement Dokka Umarov, Musa Ataev. According to the Turkish special services, all of them were victims of political persecution (http://timeturk.com/istanbulda-gizli-cecen-zirvesi--60778-haberi.html). The Yamadaev family was ill-fated. Almost all the Yamadaev brothers fought on the side of Aslan Maskhadov and in the post-war period they became one of the levers in the standoff with the Salafis. During the second military campaign (starting in 1999), all the brothers fought on the Russian side. One of the brothers, Jabrail Yamadaev, was killed by an explosion on the night of March 4-5, 2003 (www.chechnyafree.ru/article.php?IBLOCK_ID=341&SECTION_ID=568&ELEMENT_ID=59460). He was killed while he was in charge of the Vostok special purpose battalion of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Defense Ministry and was awarded the Hero of Russia medal posthumously. Another brother, Ruslan (Khalid) Yamadaev, was gunned down on September 24, 2008 in Moscow in close proximity to the headquarters of the Russian government following negotiations with government officials (http://www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=105460). The aforementioned assassination was probably a strike aimed at Sulim Yamadaev, forcing him to leave his safe haven. Ruslan Yamadaev at one point was a member of the Russian State Duma and he had also been decorated with the highest award of the country—Hero of Russia. Thus, for the first time in the modern history of Russia three members of one family had earned the Hero of Russia award, which already made this family extraordinary and seemingly a model for emulation. Yet, nothing of the sort could be detected upon closer examination. No one held up the Yamadaev brothers as examples publicly and pride in this family among ordinary Russians definitely cannot be found. Sulim Yamadaev, the former commander of the Vostok battalion, who was an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel and a recipient of the Hero of Russia award, was a blood enemy of Kadyrov. This is why few doubted that he would meet the same fate that befell his brothers. The only questions were when and how this was going to happen. The fact that the Dubai police managed to take custody of Yamadaev’s immediate executioners so quickly should be sufficient evidence of the fact that he was constantly under tacit surveillance. Kadyrov’s stableman Mahdi Lornia (an Iranian citizen), who arrived in the Emirates for a horse race, and the ethnic Tajik Mahsud Jan (a Tajik citizen) were detained immediately, while a search for four other individuals was announced. These four were ethnic Chechens from Kazakhstan and Russia, who managed to escape the territory of the Emirates (http://chechnya.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/152667). According to the local police, Sulim Yamadaev died instantly at the crime scene. He was shot with three bullets and one of them turned out to be deadly (http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090401/NATIONAL/867424210/1001). Here is where the controversy begins: members of Sulim Yamadaev’s family—his brother Issa and wife Milana—claim the complete opposite, asserting that they interacted with Sulim following the shooting and that he was in a coma but regained consciousness. The actions by Sulim Yamadaev’s relatives could be explained from the point of view of an unwillingness to disclose Sulim's death in order to conduct their own investigations. Kadyrov reacted with indignation to the accusations by the UAE police suggesting that the chief suspect in the murder was Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov’s first cousin, who is a vice premier of Chechnya’s government and represents it in the State Duma. Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov declared that Delimkhanov was his “brother, friend, right arm and all attacks against him are attacks against Ramzan Kadyrov, and they serve the purpose of defiling the Russian Federation and the leadership of Chechen Republic” (www.grozny-inform.ru/main.mhtml?Part=8&PubID=11723). At the same time, it was not quite clear why in the same statement he expressed regret over the arrest of his personal stableman since his horses would now be left without proper care! Under a barrage of accusations from the Emirates and silence from the Kremlin, Kadyrov retroactively accused Sulim Yamadaev of the murder of his father Akhmed-khadji Kadyrov, who was blown up during the World War Two Victory Day celebration in Grozny on May 9, 2004 (http://www.utro.ru/articles/2004/05/09/305878.shtml). Kadyrov made this accusation despite the fact that he had repeatedly stated that he eliminated everyone who stood behind that murder (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/152688), while he identified Akhmed Zakaev (the London-based exiled Chechen separatist official) as the man who ordered it. This appears to be an attempt to shift blame for all widely publicized crimes onto Sulim Yamadaev and, in doing so, to whitewash the reputation of Demilkhanov. Meanwhile the Dubai police announced that it will demand the extradition and arrest of Demilkhanov through Interpol. Moreover, the UAE authorities announced that Russia bears responsibility for the aforementioned crime (http://www.gulfnews.com/articles/09/04/05/10301425.html). The UAE government responded harshly to the Russian authorities’ reproach as voiced by Kadyrov and Demilkhanov. Dubai stated unequivocally that there was little doubt that the aforementioned crime was carried out in accordance with the order of Demilkhanov. Moreover, according to the Dubai chief of police, the detained culprits provided even more information than was anticipated. This was related to the fact that murder in the UAE is punishable by death and cooperation with police may save their lives during sentencing by the judge (www.gulfnews.com/nation/Police_and_The_Courts/10302926.html). In order to prevent possible accusations of bias, UAE authorities even suggested inviting international experts to investigate the murder, which allows one to infer that the investigation was carried out thoroughly and the UAE authorities’ accusations are substantiated by statements given by the detained suspects. Following the news from the UAE, people suspected in the murder of Yamadaev were arrested in Moscow. By irony of fate (or perhaps naturally), those who were detained in Moscow turned out to be closely connected to Demilkhanov. If this is not a coincidence, then one can assume that the corresponding decision to disclose the details of the murder of Yamadaev’s brother was made at the highest level in the Kremlin, which will certainly unnerve the coterie of Kadyrov. In essence, this is the first clear action against Putin’s favorite. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to understand Kadyrov’s interview with the Rossiiskaya Gazeta, in which he once again declared his personal loyalty to Putin, stating that he considers Putin a saint (http://www.rg.ru/2009/04/07/kadirov.html). Yet, only time will tell whether or not this will help Kadyrov under the new conditions, as the question of whether or not Sulim Yamadaev was murdered is no longer as salient as it may seem to those who follow the situation in the region. Dr. Mairbek Vatchagaev is the author of the book, "Chechnya in the 19th Century Caucasian Wars." Youth Activists Unravel Kremlin Status-Quo in the Circassian Heartland: “The Wind of Freedom is Approaching!” By Fatima Tlisova Is the conflict between youth and elders in the Circassian national movements just a generational dispute or is it the beginning of a revolutionary change in the Circassian regions of the North Caucasus? The generational conflict between these groups is now becoming quite obvious, as is the rising distrust on the part of Circassian youth toward anyone or anything that can be associated with the Russian state. The chain of events in historical Circassia over the past six months strongly indicates that the political landscape in the Circassian region of the North Caucasus is dramatically changing. Political activity in the republics of the North Caucasus where Circassian ethnic groups are present is no longer following its historical pattern: although the pro-Russian rhetoric that is traditional for this region is still at the forefront, the behaviour of young Circassian activists is changing. The events and initiatives in which Circassian youth is coming out in opposition and declaring its desire to act as an independent political force represent a completely new type of social activity in this region. What we saw before was a petrified traditional hierarchy with the traditional Russian-installed elders making up the decision-making layer and the Circassian youth making up the underlying layers. On the evening of April 4, a report appeared on Regnum.ru, the website of the Regnum News Agency, with the headline, “They want to label Circassian activists as separatists.” The article was about an event called The Circassian National Forum that took place on April 4 in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, and was deleted from the website after about an hour. During the one hour that the report was on the Regnum website, it was copied extensively by local on-line forums (e.g. http://www.elot.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?t=5629) as well as several international websites (e.g. http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20003). Two days later a heavily edited version of the report reappeared on Regnum.ru. Most official information about the Forum—such as the presence of the official state or ‘very-loyal-to-state’ society representatives, what topics they talked about and quotes of their remarks—remained in the edited report. Yet, the part about a group of youth from the suburbs who came to attend the April 4 Forum but were prevented by local police from entering the building where the event was being held because of so-called “security concerns” was deleted. A group of approximately 150 Circassian youth activists refused to give up and instead remained on the street waiting for the forum’s resolutions. The Circassian youth activists told local journalists that they were not going to “tolerate exclusion from the decision-making when the fate of the nation is on table [sic],” adding: “We do not trust the old leaders from the state directed charity ‘Adyge Hase’.” Later the students announced: “We plan to establish our own organization and will stand [up] for our rights” (Regnum.ru, April 4). The fact that the students declared that they were not going to tolerate the decision of Adyge Hase is a remarkable development, and for those Western analysts who are not familiar with this organization it should be noted that since ancient times Adyge Hase has served as the traditional Circassian People’s Parliament and was authorized by the Circassians to make decisions on behalf of the Circassian people. Moreover, the stance taken by the youth activists indicates that there is a growing number of Circassians who feel that the organization has simply lost its independence. Many of the members of Adyge Hase are believed to actively collaborate with the Kremlin or in some cases are active agents of the FSB. The outcry over the developments with the Circassian National Forum also extended to Abkhazia as well. It also turns out that among those who were not allowed to attend the Nalchik Forum on April 4 were not only local Circassian youth but also members of the NGO Adyghe Khase Republic of Abkhazia (AKhRA). The organization represents thousands of Abkhaz Circassians, most of whom are former combatants in the 1992 Abkhaz-Georgian war, their families and relatives. Members of the AKhRA described the forum in Nalchik as a "shameful" act in their statement and was widely published on local websites where they also underlined their expression on the Kabarda Adyge Hase, leaders who in the eyes of the Abkhaz Circassians "betrayed the idea of Circassian Nationalism and became the servants of the regime" (http://www.elot.ru/main/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1204&Itemid=1). Ibrahim Yaganov, the leader of the Federation of Horse Riding in Kabardino-Balkaria, does not belong to the youth activists but expressed his public support for their activities. Yaganov told reporters that every movement in the KBR that denies accepting direct control from the secret services suffers from “unprecedented pressure.” Yaganov’s statement is important; even though he is not an elected official, Yaganov is popular among Circassian groups and the general public because he holds the Hero of Abkhazia medal for his military accomplishments against Georgia in the 1992 Georgia-Abkhazia War. “Members of our group were continuously called to the MVD [Interior Ministry] and FSB [Federal Security Service],” he said. “They watch us closely, they listen to our phones, they use the same methods that KGB used” (http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=20003). Yaganov said he is certain that “the Russian secret services plan to receive the same financial and career benefits from the government for fighting against Circassian non-violent, non-radical organizations as they now receive for the ‘war on terror in the Caucasus’.” He added: “But we are much easier for the secret services because in contrast to the rebels, we do not physically endanger the safety of the members of secret services. That is the main reason to charge us with separatism.” The rise of an independent youth movement in the heartland of Circassia also erupted in November 2008, when the Circassian Congress announced a National Congress in Cherkessk, the capital of Karachaevo-Cherkessia (KCHR), where the Circassians are an ethnic minority together with the related Abaza people. Every single member of the movement was summoned by the FSB for questioning. According to articles that appeared in the local press, some of the leaders of the Circassian Congress made it clear that they received orders from the FSB as to what could be discussed during the National Congress. Unfortunately, this is exactly the same tactic used by the Russian FSB in its work with social movements around the entire country. Yet, the FSB system was not effective in Cherkessk. In the middle of several well-prepared state-loyal speeches given at the Forum, youth leaders came onto the stage. Two members of Adyge Hase blocked Ruslan Keshev, the leader of the independent young Circassian Congress, from taking the podium and tried to prevent him from delivering his speech. It even reached the point where the officials physically pushed Keshev from the stage in the presence of the 2,000 people present in the auditorium. Keshev's persistence eventually prevailed and he presented the project of a unified Circassia, which is a plan to reunite the divided three Circassian republics in the North Caucasus. The Circassian region has experienced 101 years of resistance against Russian colonialism—a war that ended up becoming a massive exodus and period of ethnic cleansing viewed by contemporary scholars as the Circassian genocide, or the first genocide of the 19th century. The project plan presented in Cherkessk does not presume the creation of an independent state but is limited in its goal and only seeks to unite the Circassian territories of Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Keshev underscored that the Circassians are not asking the Kremlin for something exceptional and that their request can be fitted into the Russian government’s project called Enlarging the Regions (ukrupneniye regionov), which is the basis for the Kremlin's plan on administrative reforms unveiled by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin’s plan significantly differs from the Circassians proposal. According to the Kremlin’s project, each of the three Circassian republics will be incorporated into different regions of Russia. Adygea will become part of Krasnodar Krai, while the KCHR will be swallowed up by Stavropol Krai and the KBR will be made into a mega-region together with Dagestan and possibly even Ossetia. In the eyes of Circassian nationalists, the Kremlin's plan could lead to the complete assimilation or the death of Circassian nation. When the project of a united Circassia was announced in Cherkessk, people in the auditorium gave Keshev a standing ovation and then broke into the Circassian anthem—this is according to a young member of the Circassian Congress who has since publicly resigned from his position. He added that he cannot continue working openly: “No one can. You have chains on your hands and legs. They can do with you whatever they want, whenever they want; in the end, kill you, which for them is no more difficult than to blink; that is why I am not associated with Circassian movements anymore.” The project and the idea of a unified Circassia have been widely discussed since the events of last November. The topic is being actively discussed by Circassian websites and is receiving large numbers of responses (http://www.adygi.ru/index.php?link=newsanons&action=show&id=569). On April 6, the Circassian Youth Initiative announced a new project called “One Nation—One Future,” the main goal is to change the official ethnic identification of the nation to “Circassian,” which will include all the Circassian tribes [i.e. Kabardins, Cherkess, Adyge, Shapsug, among others] (http://www.elot.ru/main/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1186&Itemid=1). The Circassian Youth Initiative has gained widespread popularity, even though there is very limited access to the Internet in the Circassian republics. Instead, the young activists—all volunteers—printed thousands of leaflets and dropped them into the mailboxes of every single household. Among the other slogans under the project there are some very characteristic ones, such as the one quoted at the top of this article: “The Wind of Freedom is Approaching!” What will happen to the Circassian Youth Initiative in the near future is not a simple issue of only local significance, but an issue concerning the condition of democracy in Russia. Will the Russian state listen to the non-violent democratic movement or simply repress them which will lead to further radicalization? Russian ethnic policy, however, cannot be considered to be on the side of democracy; therefore, pessimistic expectations are closer to the reality. Fatima Tlisova is a Human Rights Fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Tlisova is an independent journalist from the North Caucasus. |
