| IN THIS ISSUE: * Memorial: More Kidnappings in Chechnya, More Killings in Ingushetia * Ingush Presidential Bodyguards Reportedly Involved in Shootout * Chechnya: Bombings, Shootings and Counter-Terrorist Operations Persist * Dagestani Authorities Crack Down on Banned Muslim Organization * Delimkhanov Placed on Interpol Wanted List * Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat Gets a New Leader By Mairbek Vatchagaev Memorial: More Kidnappings in Chechnya, More Killings in Ingushetia According to research by the Memorial human rights group, the number of kidnappings in Chechnya and people killed in violence in Ingushetia increased between January-April of this year, compared to the same period in 2008. Kavkazky Uzel reported on April 27 that, according to Memorial, 34 people were kidnapped in Chechnya during January-April of this year, and that 20 of them were residents of the village of Dargo in the republic’s Vedeno district. Of the 34 people abducted, 27 were subsequently released, two were found murdered, two disappeared without a trace, and three were later discovered to be in prison and under investigation by the authorities. According to Memorial, seven people were abducted in Chechnya during January-April 2008 while 42 were abducted during all of 2008. Memorial concluded that the circumstances surrounding these abductions indicate that they were carried out by representatives of “state power agencies.” At the same time, the number of murders of civilians in Chechnya appears to have dropped during January-April of this year. Memorial found that two civilians were killed in the republic, compared with the five people that were killed in Chechnya during the same period of last year. Kavkazky Uzel reported that according to information from open sources, some 88 special operations and shootouts took place in Chechnya during January-March of this year, along with three terrorist attacks, taking the lives of at least four law-enforcement officers, seven suspected militants and five civilians, and wounding at least 12 law-enforcement officers and three civilians. According to the website, there were 29 abductions in Chechnya, including five cases in which civilians were kidnapped and later found dead, between January-March of this year. At least 66 militants or their accomplices were detained and 37 rebel weapons caches and 17 rebel bases were discovered in Chechnya during the first three months of 2009. In addition, 1,060 explosive devices were defused in the republic during the same period. According to Memorial, there was roughly the same number of abductions in Ingushetia during January-April of this year as during the same period of 2008. Three people were kidnapped in the republic between January-April of this year, two of whom were murdered and one who remains unaccounted for. From January to April 2008, two people were kidnapped in Ingushetia, one of whom was subsequently freed, while the other person disappeared without a trace. A total of 22 people were abducted in Ingushetia during all of last year. At the same time the number of killings in Ingushetia has risen sharply: according to Memorial, 59 people were killed in the republic during the first four months of this year. These include 21 civilians (6 killed by unknown persons, five killed by or believed to have been killed by law-enforcement authorities, two killed by militants, and eight people killed in an explosion that destroyed the offices of Ingushetia’s court bailiffs in Nazran in January), 12 local law-enforcement officers, six servicemen deployed in Ingushetia from around Russia and 20 militants. By comparison, Memorial recorded nine people killed in Ingushetia during the first four months of 2008, including six civilians and three law-enforcement officers. According to Kavkazky Uzel, there were 38 armed attacks on military and law-enforcement personnel in Ingushetia during the first three months of 2009, which killed 12 people and wounded 32. In addition, at least 17 civilians were murdered and three people were kidnapped, two of whom were later found dead. During this period, security forces carried out at least 10 special operations targeting militants (two in wooded areas, the rest in urban areas) in which 16 suspected militants were killed. Six members of the security forces were killed and 28 wounded during these operations. According to the Kavkazky Uzel website, during the first three months of this year, there were 19 bombings in Ingushetia that killed nine people and wounded nine others, and 15 explosive devices were defused. Meanwhile, there were 10 incidents in which law-enforcement agency buildings in the republic came under fire. There were also arson, bombing and shooting attacks on six food stores and one kiosk, three shooting attacks on restaurants and cafés, one shooting attack on a sauna and another on a bowling club. Three counter-terrorist regimes were imposed on different Ingush towns and villages and two instances in which rebel bases and arms caches were discovered. Meanwhile, the Ingush human rights organization Mashr reported on April 6 that eight people were kidnapped and 212 killed in Ingushetia in 2008. In addition, Mashr reported that 169 people kidnapped in Ingushetia since 2002 remain unaccounted for. Ingush Presidential Bodyguards Reportedly Involved in Shootout Kavkazky Uzel reported on April 29 that unidentified attackers the previous evening fired an anti-tank grenade launcher at a group of servicemen who were guarding a train loaded with military equipment in Ingushetia’s Sunzha district. No one was hurt in the incident. On the evening of April 28, a shootout took place in Nazran’s Nasyr-Kort district: according to some reports, the gun battle was between policemen and members of Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov’s bodyguard detail. According to one report, three people were killed in the shootout—two policemen and one of the presidential bodyguards—and another presidential bodyguard was hospitalized with gunshot wounds. According to another report, however, one policeman and two bodyguards were killed in the shootout. The Ingush president’s press service said the shootout was not an attempt on the life of Yevkurov, who was not travelling with the bodyguards at the time of the attack, but was simply a case of mistaken identity. However, according to other reports, the shootout began when a policeman manning a checkpoint fired at the presidential bodyguards during a dispute. Still, details of the incident—including who exactly was involved—remain sketchy and contradictory. Interfax reported on April 29 that the incident took place at the intersection of a road connecting Nazran and Magas and the Kavkaz federal highway, and quoted investigators as saying that the shootout followed a quarrel between interior ministry officers and “unidentified civilians.” According to Interfax, a policeman identified as Beslan Khachubarov and a local resident—identified simply as “Kodzoev”—were killed in the shootout, while another policeman, identified as Musa Korigov, was wounded. For its part, Kavkazky Uzel on April 29 quoted an unnamed law-enforcement source as saying the shootout was the result of an ongoing dispute between members of the republic’s presidential bodyguards and a group of unidentified civilians. Kavkazky Uzel reported on April 28 that Bashir Tsechoev, a 35-year-old resident of one of Nazran’s municipal districts, was shot in the head when seven or eight people wearing masks and camouflage uniforms burst into his home. The attackers escaped in two cars, and Tsechoev died later in the hospital. On April 27, unidentified gunmen fired on the home of judo master Isa Tseloev in Nazran. No one was hurt in the attack. That same day, bomb disposal experts in Ingushetia’s Nazran district successfully defused a bomb that had been placed under a car belonging to Magomed Albogachiev, an officer with the patrol-sentry service of Ingushetia’s Interior Ministry. Meanwhile, Kavkazky Uzel reported on April 29 that internally displaced people from Chechnya who are presently living in Ingushetia had been warned that they should leave the republic and return to Chechnya before May 1. The website quoted Aslambek Apaev, a North Caucasus expert with the Moscow Helsinki Group who is also chairman of the Committee for Protecting the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, as saying that pressure was being put on the displaced Chechens to return home and that the Mekhstroi temporary residence facility, located in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya in Ingushetia’s Sunzha district, had already been without electricity for two days. According to Apaev, Ingush authorities have warned the Chechens living in temporary residences that they will be evicted by police if they have not left by May 1. Chechnya: Bombings, Shootings and Counter-Terrorist Operations Persist RIA Novosti reported on April 25 that three explosions and a shooting over the previous 24-hour period in Chechnya had left one soldier dead and three wounded. A law enforcement source told the news agency that a soldier was killed when gunmen fired on a temporary checkpoint in Elistanzhy in the Vedeno district, while a local police officer in the republican capital Grozny was wounded when two explosions occurred 150 meters from the Sultan Bilmkhanov soccer stadium. The source said a third explosion went off as bomb disposal teams worked to clear the site, wounding a military commander and a member of the Chechen presidential security service. On April 24, the military commandant of Grozny, Colonel Igor Magkeyev, was wounded by an improvised explosive device. Agence France-Presse quoted an anonymous local police official as saying that the makeshift explosive had been planted in garbage next to a store in Grozny and that Magkeyev was hospitalized but that his injuries were not serious. Meanwhile, just a week after the Russian government formally announced that its counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya was over (North Caucasus Weekly, April 17 and 24), Interfax reported that the Russian military had launched new counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya’s Shali, Shatoi and Vedeno districts on April 24. The news agency quoted officials as saying that militants were “intensifying their activities” and that “terrorist attacks” targeting “executive authorities and law enforcement officials” were being planned. Itar-Tass on April 24 quoted a spokesman for the Russian military’s operational headquarters for Chechnya, Vladimir Patrin, as saying that the new counter-terrorist operations in the three districts meant that counter-terrorist operations were now in five areas of the republic. Patrin said that counter-terrorist operations had been taking place in a number of villages of the Itum-Kale district and the highland areas of the Vedeno district since April 20. “The headquarters has decided to conduct operations in the areas where militants have stepped up their activities,” Patrin said. Kavkazky Uzel on April 24 quoted Chechens as expressing concern over reports of renewed counter-terrorist operations in the republic. The website quoted an anonymous head of a local non-governmental organization as saying that he and some of his colleagues had predicted that the military and special services would not agree to end the counter-terrorist operation and would do what they could to ensure that tensions persisted in Chechnya. “The latest events have shown that we were right,” he said, adding that he could not rule out that something similar to the 1999 apartment building bombings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and other Russian cities, which became the official pretext for launching the second Russian military offensive in Chechnya, could take place. “I mean that major acts of terror or assassinations of political figures may occur in Grozny or somewhere else and that may become a pretext for increasing repression and abolishing the Kremlin’s decision to lift the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya,” he said. Meanwhile, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov on April 24 “angrily denied and expressed surprise” at media reports that counter-terrorist operations had been launched again in some of the republic’s districts, Interfax reported. “I am chairman of [republican] the anti-terrorism commission,” Kadyrov told the news agency. “And it is the commission that must be the first to decide on a counterterrorist operation. We control the situation in every district and in every town and village, and we are convinced there is no reason for disseminating statements that an operation is underway. If there is an operation underway, who does it target and where is it taking place? What militants are there in Mesker-Yurt, Belgatoi and Avtury of Shali district, and in the other districts that are mentioned? Has anyone seen any special operations being conducted in that region today? Of course not.” Dagestani Authorities Crack Down on Banned Muslim Organization Several Russian news agencies reported on April 30 that two people were wounded when police and interior ministry troops in Dagestan were involved in what RIA Novosti called “a friendly-fire shootout” the previous day. The news agency, quoting an anonymous law-enforcement source, reported that the shootout occurred as a result of “uncoordinated actions” in a forest near the village of Kakashura in Dagestan’s Karabudakhkentsky district. Yet, a spokesman for Dagestan’s Interior Ministry told RIA Novosti he had “no information” about such an incident. Interfax, for its part, reported that the shootout involved Nogaisky district police officers, on one side, and servicemen from a unit of the Russian Interior Ministry Internal Troops “carrying out special activities,” on the other. Interfax reported that a contract serviceman and a district patrol officer were wounded and hospitalized. In March, four servicemen, including an attack helicopter gunner, were wounded while battling a group of 10-15 militants on the outskirts of Kakashura (North Caucasus Weekly, March 20). Interfax reported on April 28 that Magomedkhabib Umakhanov, nephew of the head of the Khasavyurt municipality, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, was shot and killed when his car came under fire near the town’s market. Interfax reported on April 27 that a serviceman was wounded when a bomb detonated as a convoy of trucks carrying interior ministry internal troops was moving along the Kavkaz federal highway in Khasavyurt district. Meanwhile, Itar-Tass reported on April 28 that a joint operation by the interior ministry and the Dagestani branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) had “exposed” the activities of the Nurdzhular (Nurcular) religious organization, which was banned by Russia’s Supreme Court in April 2008. A spokesman for the republican FSB told the news agency that police had “zeroed in” on meetings held in the Dagestani town of Izberbash by members of Nurdzhular, including nine Russian citizens, seven Azerbaijanis and Nurdzhular “coordinator” Erdemir Ali Ishan, a Turkish citizen. The FSB alleged that Ishan had held meetings of activists of the group in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Kazan and Krasnoyarsk. “During the meetings, the activists were studying extremist literature and discussed further plans for the operation of the organization in Russia,” the FSB spokesman told Itar-Tass. He said that Nurdzhular members were found with financial documents indicating that $72,000 had been spent on “propaganda” in Dagestan and that police also found literature deemed extremist by a Moscow court in May 2007. The FSB spokesman said that all the detained members of the group had been questioned and released except for the Azerbaijanis and Ishan, who remain in custody. Delimkhanov Placed on Interpol Wanted List Seven Russian citizens, including Adam Delimkhanov, the State Duma deputy and cousin of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, have been put on Interpol’s wanted list at the request of the United Arab Emirates in connection with last month’s murder of former Vostok battalion commander Sulim Yamadaev in Dubai (North Caucasus Weekly, April 3, 10 and 17). Along with Delimkhanov, the other six men placed on Interpol’s wanted list—Zelimkhan Mazaev, Elimpasha Khatsuev, Salman Kimayev, Tirpal Kimaev, Ramazan Musiev and Marvan Kimaev—are “primarily of Chechen nationality,” Russia Today reported on April 28. The UAE newspaper The Nation on April 28 quoted Interpol as saying in a statement that it welcomed the Dubai police department’s request that it issue Red Notices, or international wanted notices, for the seven Russian nationals in connection with the killing of Yamadaev. “These men are accused of plotting and carrying out a murder in the United Arab Emirates, and circulating their details worldwide on Interpol Red Notices means that other countries are fully informed and can take any appropriate measures within their own laws to detain or arrest the individuals and therefore protect their own citizens,” The Nation quoted Interpol’s secretary general, Ronald K. Noble, as saying. As the newspaper noted, Dubai’s police chief, Lieutenant General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, has called the Yamadaev assassination “a dirty operation of settling scores, of a purely Chechen making” that spilled over abroad. Tamim has also said that unquestionable evidence, including a gold-plated pistol, was traced to Delimkhanov’s security guards. According to the Dubai police, the pistol—a Makarov—and a jacket and gloves worn by the killer were found dumped near the crime scene. Meanwhile, Pavel Krasheninnikov, who chairs the State Duma’s committee on civil, criminal and administrative law, said on April 27 that Russia will under no circumstances extradite Delimkhanov to the UAE in connection with the Yamadaev murder. “A Russian citizen cannot be extradited to a foreign country for court proceedings,” RIA Novosti quoted Krasheninnikov as saying. “This is written in the Constitution of our country.” Russia Today noted that Russian authorities have said they have no proof of Delimkhanov’s involvement in wrongdoing and quoted Krasheninnikov as saying that if Russian law enforcement is given such proof, “it can serve only as a reason for investigation and trial inside the country.” Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat Gets a New Leader By Mairbek Vatchagaev For nearly two months after the death of the last leader of Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat, Emir Muaz (Umar Sheikhullaev), who was killed in Leninkent, a suburb of the Dagestani capital Makhachkala, during a special operation on February 5 (http://www.kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/02/16/64019.shtml), the Sharia Jamaat operated without a leader. One can only guess why it took 60 days to appoint a new emir since the armed underground issued no comments or clarifications regarding this appointment. According to Muhanned, the naib (deputy) of the military emir of the Armed Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, the emir of Caucasus Emirate, Dokka Umarov, announced, in a videotape issued on April 6, his decision to appoint Al Bar, who commands the militant front in Dagestan, as the new emir (http://www.jamaatshariat.com/content/view/1047/41/). At the same time the statement included an interesting caveat: “perhaps there are those among you, who do not agree with this decision, but we urge you to accept this candidacy,” it stated. The appointment of the new emir is complete with three naibs and the corresponding proposal to divide Dagestan into three parts (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcqazG-8lfA). That is to say, an administrative reform is proposed in a given part of the virtual Caucasus Emirate. The recently appointed emir is from among those who have been active on the territory adjacent to Chechnya—the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan. Perhaps that is why those militants who are carrying out sabotage activities in the vicinity of Makhachkala and Buinaksk are unhappy with this appointment. The very name of “Al Bar,” translated from the Arabic, means “detachment.” It is derived from the name of one of the famous followers of Prophet Muhammad—Al Bar ibn Malik al-Ansari. Moreover, even a certain hadith is associated with his name, in which there is a reference to his unruly character. The second Caliph Umar allegedly warned against his appointment in the following statement: “Do not appoint Al Bar the commander of any of the Muslim armies because there is fear that he will lose troops with his recklessness” (http://caucase.wordpress.com/2009/03/25/). Time will tell how much the new leader will associate himself with the historical figure through his actions. The truth is that militant leaders often pick nom de guerres both for conspiratorial purposes and out of affinity with this or that historical figure. Muhanned’s three-minute video address contains several passages requiring a more detailed examination. For instance, as an aide to the military emir, Muhanned mentioned his immediate commander Emir Magas, who has been signing documents simply as the leader of Ingushetia’s Sharia Jamaat for the past two years. Furthermore, it is unclear why Muhanned announced the appointment of the new emir of Dagestan twice, and yet neither the military Emir Magas nor Caucasus Emirate leader Dokka Umarov has made any mention of it. Although this is not that important—and perhaps it is not worth drawing far-reaching conclusions—the very fact that the Emirate’s mouthpiece is a foreign representative amply demonstrates the role and place of those who arrived from the Middle Eastern countries. It is a common fallacy, given that a foreigner is instantly seen as an expert in Islamic theology, even though more often than not these people are far removed from any theological knowledge. Exactly ten days after the announcement of the new emir, another public statement was released on behalf of the members of Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat, in which a pledge of loyalty is sworn to the new Emir Al Bara (http://www.jamaatshariat.com/content/view/1053/34/). It specifies that jamaat members will fight to the death under his leadership. Apparently Muhanned’s caveat regarding some militants who may disagree with the appointment should not be dismissed lightly. It is possible that after the death of Emir Muaz, the jamaats (the Sharia Jamaat incorporates many locally based jamaats in districts and large cities of Dagestan) proposed their candidates to fill the Emir’s position, as it had been done before. The selection of Al Bara may be attributed to the fact that the old emirs, who were “raised” under the unified leadership of Shamil Basaev, are gradually exiting the scene, while the new names mean little to the Chechen leadership. On the contrary, Emir Al Bara, as a commander of the detachment deployed in the region adjacent to Chechnya, probably maintains constant contacts with the leadership of the Caucasus Emirate—which is to say with the people of Dokka Umarov—and this, in turn, simplifies the coordination of joint actions. Thus, a strategic choice is made—although probably not in the best interests of unity in the Dagestani Jamaat. In essence, the entire territory of Dagestan is engulfed in militant operations carried out by the armed underground, but for the guerrillas in Makhachkala, Buinaksk and the south of the republic, the new emir may not be as authoritative as were his predecessors at the helm of the Sharia Jamaat in Dagestan. Meanwhile the Russian special services and the Dagestani police continue to report to the public about their successes on the frontlines of the battle with the armed opposition. Thus, on April 14, the law enforcement authorities for the umpteenth time trumpeted the liquidation of yet another al-Qaeda “emissary” in the North Caucasus—the Turkish citizen Ziya Peche. He has already been “killed” twice in Chechnya, judging by the information provided by the Federal Security Service (FSB) (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1156125&ThemesID=418). This time the FSB is certain that its operatives eliminated him in Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district. Following its old habits, the FSB views all foreign citizens in the ranks of the armed underground exclusively as al-Qaeda emissaries. At the same time, it is not quite clear why al-Qaeda would dispatch so many emissaries to a small territory in the North Caucasus region, one which is never mentioned in any of the public statements made by al-Qaeda leaders. Against this backdrop, a news report about the liquidation of another figure from the Sharia Jamaat leadership, Zakir Navruzov, came from the southern part of Dagestan. This is also not the first news report about his elimination. For instance, he was already declared to have been killed back in September 2008 (http://www.grani.ru/War/m.150378.html). This time, however, the Russian special services say they managed to track him down while he was having a rendezvous with his wife and child. The police surrounded the house and offered Zakir the chance to surrender, while his wife and little girl were safely escorted out of the house. After a brief gunfight the special services reported that they killed him. Zakir Navruzov was famous as a close supporter of Emir Abdul Mejid (Ilgar Mollachiev), who was killed in September 2008. As his successor in this southern region, Navruzov was responsible for leading the jamaat of Lezgins and for supporting the jamaat created by Emir Abdul Mejid (Ilgar Mollachiev) between July-August 2008 in Azerbaijan (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1161695). The losses suffered by the Dagestani jamaat, especially among its leadership, have been plaguing the militants since the late summer of 2008. However, this has had no impact on the quality of the operations carried out by the armed underground. The lethality of the militant assaults on both law enforcement authorities and civilians in Dagestan in 2008 increased by 40 percent, according to former Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, who is now chairman of the Directorate of Global Anti-Criminal and Anti-Terrorist Forum (www.yuga.ru/news/152124). If these estimates even remotely correspond with the reality, they clearly demonstrate that Dagestan’s Sharia Jamaat not only has not been crippled by the loss of leadership but, on the contrary, continues to conduct multiple strikes. Since early April, there have been several militant actions in Dagestan. A police officer and two of his brothers were killed in the wooded area in Khasavyurt district (kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/04/06/64923.shtml). On April 10, landmines were laid next to a gas pipeline, and a police officer was killed while attempting to defuse the mines. Due to the reactivation of the armed underground, additional military detachments were deployed to the Khasavyurt district on April 21 (kavkaz.tv/russ/content/2009/04/21/65193.shtml). Thus, it is possible to conjecture that lately the center of gravity of the armed underground on the territory of Dagestan has been gradually shifting to Khasavyurt district, which borders Chechnya. Whether this is a sustained trend and whether there is a redistribution of forces for the spring-summer offensive, which the authorities always interpret as the period of the fiercest resistance by the militants against the state bodies in the region, will become clear in the near future. Dr. Mairbek Vatchagaev is the author of the book, "Chechnya in the 19th Century Caucasian Wars." |
