**New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog): Distrust between Russia and EU builds over Eastern Partnership initiative
It was announced only last week that President Dmitry Medvedev signed an order dismissing four star General Valentin Korabelnikov -the all-powerful chief of military intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate or GRU. Korabelnikov (63) was appointed chief of GRU in May 1997 and the official reason for his dismissal was "old age." According to Russian law, generals may serve until 60 and their active service can be prolonged by presidential decree until 65, which is reviewed annually. The decree that ousted Korabelnikov from his post and retired him from military service was signed by Medvedev on April 14, but only published last week. First Deputy Chief of the GRU General Alexander Shlakhturov (62) was appointed as Korabelnikov's successor. Shlakhturov's age indicates he will be a provisional caretaker chief, presiding while the GRU is restructured (Kommersant, April 25).
Two other high-ranking Defense Ministry officials were ousted this month: Deputy Defense Minister in charge of budget and finance Lubov Kudelina, and the chief of the Main Personnel Directorate three star General Mikhail Vodzakin. Last month Vodzakin was retired from active service, though continuing to serve in the same position as a civilian. He was eventually replaced by General Viktor Goremikin (RIA Novosti, April 23). In May 2001 Kudelina, a former Deputy Finance Minister, became the first woman to be appointed Deputy Defense Minister in Russia. Kudelina was replaced by another high-ranking Finance Ministry official -Vera Chistova (Kommersant, April 16). With the departure of Korabelnikov, Kudelina and Vodzakin, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, in office since 2007, has more or less ended the process of changing the top MoD officials appointed before him and in effect he has crushed the remnants of high-level resistance within the MoD to his controversial reforms.
Serdukov's plans to modernize and westernize the Russian conventional armed forces have met with opposition. High-ranking generals dislike the planned reform, since it demolishes the old Cold War force modeled on fighting NATO and instead plans to create a new smaller standing army -designed using Western militaries as a prototype. In a recent interview former Defense Minister (1992-1996) General Pavel Grachev, summed up this widespread attitude: "In shaping reform plans we must not copy the nations that are preparing to conquer Russia." According to Grachev, Russia needs to maintain sizeable armed forces to defend itself and any future reform must be modeled on the experience of World War II, as he recalls that in the early 1990's he successfully resisted attempts to "Americanize" the military (Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, March 20).
In March 2008 the Russian media reported a "general's rebellion" against the reform within the MoD, led by the First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky, supported by other top officials (Izvestia, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 24; Trud, March 25). Serdyukov in turn was supported by Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and the "general's rebellion" was defeated and its protagonists ousted one by one. Baluyevsky was removed in June 2008.
The GRU led by Korabelnikov seemed to be the last bastion of organized resistance to the reforms. The GRU is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff and is a separate structure within the armed forces. Its agents perform global espionage operations and the GRU maintains operational control over Russian spy satellites. It also commands "special radio communications brigades" tasked with intercepting foreign electronic communications. The GRU gathers and analyzes intelligence information to present reports to Russia's political and military leaders. The Chief of the General Staff approves these reports. The GRU, and through it the General Staff, have their own considerable independent combat capabilities -the Special Forces or Spetsnaz brigades (8 brigades at present) and smaller separate Special Forces units. The GRU and the General Staff control significant institutional capabilities to influence Russian defense, national security and foreign policy decision-making.
Reports have been circulating within the Russian press that the GRU faces serious reform. The GRU will be cut in size and might be split into several parts (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, January 9, Rossyiskaya Gazeta March 17). It seems to have been decided that the GRU Spetsnaz units will be subordinated to a separate Special Operations Command as in the United States. The GRU may also be fully removed from the General Staff and be subordinated to a civilian Defense Minister. This will prevent the General Staff top brass from doctoring intelligence reports and manipulating Russia's defense and foreign policy decision-making.
The personnel of the General Staff, central staffs and command structures will be cut from 21,813 to 8,500 by 2012. In Moscow city and the Moscow region around 30,000 officers will be discharged (RIA Novosti, April 25). The Main Operational Directorate or GOU is the core of the General Staff and is in command of the strategic nuclear deterrent among other things. GOU personnel has been cut in half with some 200 generals and senior officers already dismissed (Interfax, April 3). It was announced that up to 20 percent of the top military commanders will be retired in disgrace, "as not conforming" to service standards (RIA Novosti, April 28).
The announced cuts are causing outrage within the military, but the reforms are fully supported by Russia's political leaders. With high-level resistance squashed within the MoD, the grassroots discontent from rank and file officers will be disorganized. While some are fired, others are promoted and given better pay. Military reform in Russia plows ahead.
--Pavel Felgenhauer
"Water Summit" in Central Asia Ends in Stalemate
On April 28, the five Central Asian leaders met in Almaty to discuss water issues related to the Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and downstream countries dominated the summit's agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for their plans to implement more assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn, demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional balance without clarifying how this might be achieved.
In short, the regional gathering once again proved to be a failure with the oil and gas-rich downstream countries -Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan- disregarding the interests of the upstream countries -Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan- that rely heavily on their water resources. The summit took place amid low water levels in upstream countries and uncertainties within the region as it faces the global economic crisis.
The summit highlighted the current stalemate within the region between upstream states' displeasure and downstream states' plans to construct new large-scale dams (EDM, December 2, 2008). Downstream countries, however, are reluctant to improve their irrigation infrastructure, thus failing to ease the burden on their upstream neighbors. As a result, each year the downstream countries lack sufficient water for irrigation in the summer months, while upstream countries suffer from severe shortages of electricity in winter.
Uzbekistan plays an important role in this impasse. With half the region's 50 million population, its needs for irrigation are increasing every year, while its infrastructure continues to deteriorate. According to international experts' estimates, approximately 50 to 70 percent of water is lost on its territory due to its poor irrigation infrastructure. But Uzbekistan's supplies of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan allow Tashkent to dictate its own terms and promote its interests within interstate water management. Uzbekistan annually increases prices for natural gas to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the price reaching $240 per thousand cubic meters in 2009.
Kyrgyz leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev raised the possibility of selling services of water collection and storage to downstream countries. This would allow upstream countries to manage water resources more efficiently. As he rightly argued, this suggestion is backed by international regulations on trans-border water resource management. Yet, the Uzbek leader in particular, opposed this idea. Karimov further condemned the construction of new dams by upstream countries, accusing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan of considering construction of hydropower plants that were designed during the Soviet period. Karimov argued that without the international community's investigation, both countries should abstain from constructing these dams (www.akipress.kg, April 28).
Both upstream and downstream countries referred to international organizations' recommendations regarding water management. In his speech Bakiyev argued that he is following the recommendations of the World Bank in setting forward conditions to downstream countries (www.ca-news.org, April 29).
The Kyrgyz leader himself is partly to blame for failing to curb corruption in the hydropower sector. Since last spring Kyrgyzstan has been suffering from water shortages and the government had to ration electricity supplies throughout the winter. The crisis was caused in part by natural phenomena, as well as by the poor management of the sector. During 2005-2008, the Kyrgyz hydropower sector reported over 40 percent losses, some of which might be accounted for through illicit exports of electricity. In late 2008 and the beginning of this year, these losses comprised roughly 30 percent, indicating that the illicit trade of electricity has declined during the crisis.
The summit ended with the signing of an agreement without any specific detail on transnational water management. According to an expert from a think tank in Washington, constructing large dams will only add stress to the regional collaboration efforts. Instead, short term solutions should be sought, such as working on improving living conditions at village level. Any national regime change in Central Asia, however, has the potential to significantly transform the regional dynamics in interstate water management.
In the meantime, Central Asian leaders' approach towards interstate water management is only short-term and lacks concern for future economic development. Tensions between states, therefore, will continue largely as a consequence of the antagonistic personal relations between the region's leaders. As long as these relations persist, Central Asia will face stalemate in cooperation over trans-boundary water management.
--Erica Marat
The PKK Intensifies its Terrorist Campaign
On April 27, Police in Istanbul conducted operations on 60 different addresses, targeting the newly emerged militant organization Devrimci Karargah (DK) (Revolutionary Base). The police detained 40 suspects. At one address they exchanged gunfire with a militant for over six-hours. During the operation, the militant -Orhan Yilmazkaya- a police captain, and a civilian were killed and seven other police officers were wounded (Zaman, November 28, 2008). The police later discovered that the DK organization is a leftist revolutionary organization which has an association with the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). In fact, video footage relating to the killed member of the DK was later released to the media, clearly showing that PKK members were instructing Yilmazkaya in the use of weapons (Milliyet, April 28).
This recent clash with the police was not the DK's first terrorist attack. In August 2008, the DK organized a failed attempt to attack the 1st Army headquarters in Istanbul (Milliyet, August 13, 2008). On December 1, 2008 the DK targeted the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Istanbul office, during which ten civilians were wounded (www.bianet.org, December 2, 2008).
Turkish intelligence agencies reported that the DK organization was formed by the PKK in order to operate within city centers on their behalf. In these same reports, it was alleged that the PKK has redeployed its Turkish members to operate under the banner of the DK to conceal the PKK's involvement (Milliyet, April 29). Another interesting development concerning the DK occurred in October 2008, when the merger was announced of the DK with the Revolutionary Left organization -another leftist Turkish militant organization. In that announcement, both organizations declared that "the DK by joining the Revolutionary Left, strengthened its power to intensify its attack on major cities in Turkey. The DK has decided to associate with the PKK which is a necessity for the revolution" (Firat News Agency, October 6, 2008).
In addition to the DK, the PKK has also intensified its attacks on the Turkish armed forces. On April 29, the PKK managed to explode an Improvized Explosive Device (IED) in the countryside in Diyarbakir province, targeting an armored military vehicle and killing nine soldiers (Milliyet, April 29). Another clash between the PKK and the Turkish military, took place in Semdinli in Hakkari province. In that clash PKK militants killed one Turkish soldier. In addition, PKK supporters threw Molotov cocktails in Van and Adana provinces (Hurriyet, April 29).
The recent terrorist attacks took place during the period of a unilateral ceasefire by the PKK which it had declared in early March, before later extending this until June 1 (Milliyet, April 15). On the same day as the clash between the DK militant and the police, the leader of the Democratic Society Party, the political wing of the PKK, gave an interview to the Turkish press in which he argued that the PKK might withdraw its militants from Turkish territory if the authorities adopted a "positive attitude" toward the Kurdish question (Taraf, April 27). At the same time the PKK leader Murat Karayilan declared that if Turkey's leadership does not approach the PKK's ceasefire positively, then the PKK may intensify its attacks on the Turkish security forces (ANF News Agency, April 14).
The recent PKK attack happened shortly after the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Staff Admiral Michael Mullen's visit to Northern Iraq and Ankara on April 25 (Zaman, April 26). Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug stated that they had discussed regional developments, including the situation within northern Iraq (Hurriyet, April 29).
It appears that the PKK, under pressure from the international community, and especially with the influence of Kurdish leaders within northern Iraq, declared a unilateral ceasefire in March and extended it until June. However, as the international community's attention has shifted to other issues such as Afghanistan and Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, the PKK has now resumed its terrorist campaign.
Clearly, the AKP government's rapprochement policies toward Armenia disappointed the nationalist segments of Turkish society. If the PKK continues its terrorist campaign it will further galvanize Turkish nationalists in their attitudes toward the AKP government. In this case, the AKP government may face a severe test of its policy on the Kurdish issue.
--Emrullah Uslu
