*Moscow faces the risk of losing Russian Far East and Siberia as regions chart their own course
*Turkey's Armenia initiative threatens to undermine relations with Azerbaijan
*Reshuffling elevates geostrategist Davutoglu to the post of Turkish Foreign Minister
**New in the Jamestown blog on Russia and Eurasia (http://www.jamestown.org/blog): NATO Expels Two Russian Diplomats
Moscow Tightens its Grip on the Regions as Wealth Declines
Over the past decade, Vladimir Putin's policies, federal in name and unitary in substance, deprived units of the Russian Federation of their own money. Not unlike in the "good old" Soviet era, the federal center claimed all the collected revenues, and then decided on the allocation of subsidies. Though such stringent cash control helped keep the local authorities under control, it also badly hurt the Russian economy. In 1999, 31 of the existing 89 units of the Russian Federation functioned as "donor regions," which provided subsidies to support the rest of the country (Novyye Izvestia, March 15, 2007). Now, just 12 regions among the incumbent 84 function as "donors," supporting the rest of the country at Moscow's discretion (Paralmentskaya Gazeta, March 27, 2008).
As the ongoing systemic financial crisis is markedly worsening, the long subjugated units of the Russian Federation are increasingly displaying signs of discontent. The specter of separatism threatens to become as menacing as it did briefly in the 1990's. However, this time the separatists will hardly attempt to hoist their banners over regional capitals, and fight federal troops in the way seen in Chechnya. Now, they prefer to claim allegiance to the center, paying lip service to the "Czar and the flag," and make sure their cash flows abroad, rather than go to Moscow.
The Jewish Region is the first such major case on record with Moscow launching a major probe. However, it is an open secret that the Russian Far East's economy -and virtually its entire foreign trade- is oriented towards China, Japan and South Korea rather than to Russia. Even Putin's envoy to the Far East General Konstantin Pulikovsky said in 2003 that "the Far Eastern Economy is 80 percent oriented to Asian-Pacific region's countries, with only 20 percent to Russia" (www.top.rbc.ru, June 20, 2003).
Moscow is now facing the possible risk of losing its Far East and Siberia entirely, both economically, and in the longer term politically. Surprisingly, the federal authorities seem quite indifferent both to the plight of their main and richest territories, or to the serious possibility of their gradual dislocation from the state. Some still believe they can put down any attempt at independence by resorting to crude force, though they fail to show success in the separatist North Caucasus, where they have been trying to crush separatism since 1994.
On April 29, Vladimir Ryzhkov, a scholar from the Altai in Siberia, formerly a liberal deputy in the Duma and now a professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, told the Irkutsk-based Baikalskiye Vesti that Moscow has "cast aside" Siberia (www.politirkutsk.ru, April 29). Ryzhkov made a very strong case, suggesting that Moscow's policies had turned the formerly prosperous region into a dying territory. According to Ryzhkov, it is now cheaper to fly from Moscow to Western Europe than from the capital to Vladivostok. As a result, Ryzhkov pointed out, "six of the ten poorest regions of the Russian Federation are Siberian."
Ryzhkov sees one basic solution - Moscow must "leave a greater part of the taxes collected there" to Siberia. But that is exactly what Moscow, scared by a potential challenge to its "power vertical," stubbornly refuses to do - increasingly pushing regional elites to seek solutions for their economic ills across the border.
Economic discontent is serving to fuel political tensions. Some major republics within Russia seem to be asserting or preparing new legal grounds for their independence in the event of further trouble. On February 19, the legislature of the diamond-rich Siberian Sakha-Yakutia ruled not to drop provisions in its constitution affirming its sovereignty - and its people as the source of that sovereignty rather than exclusively belonging to the Russian Federation (Kommersant, February 19).
National republics within Russia, such as Sakha, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, or Chechnya all have similar provisions within their constitutions, which Moscow views as potentially separatist and still cannot remove -even though these federal entities are run by members of the ruling United Russia Party, chaired by Putin. Meanwhile, the ethnic Russian regions, such as Krasnoyarsk or Yekaterinburg (also ruled by Putin loyalists) discuss their withdrawal from the much-touted Putin-Medvedev "national projects," decreed to upgrade Russia. Now, these regions do not want to be part of them, citing the failure of the federal authorities to deliver the promised funds. (www.newsru.com, February 11).
Kaliningrad Governor Georgy Boos, another staunch Putin loyalist, called on Moscow to "increase the independence of the regions" so that they will be better able to combat the consequences of the economic crisis. Moscow remains firmly determined to collect and harshly control the distribution of regional revenues in order to retain its central authority. Meanwhile, the economic potential of the poorer regions is flowing abroad, ironically reducing Moscow's political influence and power to the point of a dangerous national breakup.
--Yuri Zarakhovich
Baku Calling for Openness in Turkish-Armenian Relations
Most Azerbaijani politicians as well as the general public believe that the recent developments in Turkey's bilateral relationship with Armenia were aimed only at influencing Barack Obama's April 24 statement. Supposedly, Turkey wanted to provide a reason for Obama to avoid using the word "genocide" when referring to the events of 1915. Now that Turkey has avoided this potential degradation in its relations with the United States, one of its closest allies, the question remains as to whether Turkey and Armenia will continue taking steps towards each other, or if their declared intention to normalize bilateral relations was only a tactical move.
The government in Azerbaijan is carefully monitoring all the statements coming from both Yerevan and Ankara. It appears that the Turkish government is keen to continue on this track, which raises concerns within Baku. On April 13, a spokesman from Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Elkhan Polukhov, said that "the opening of the border will be a tactical and strategic mistake and will increase the tensions in the region." While the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov, stated four days earlier that, "the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia is possible in the context of the resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani Karabakh conflict." Azimov added that the discussions on the issue could be included in the negotiation process on the Karabakh conflict, and that any normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations might occur in phases, in parallel with the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories (www.day.az. April 8).
Indeed, both the Azerbaijani public and the leadership of the country categorically oppose a one-sided approach to the re-opening the Turkish-Armenian border. Foremost, Baku fears that opening the border will further strengthen Armenia and make it less cooperative in any future negotiations. Until now Azerbaijan had hoped that economics would play a decisive role in compelling Armenia to give up the occupied territories. Regional economic development between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey was often cited as an example of Armenia's mistaken strategic choice, which led the country into economic and political isolation within the region. Baku hoped that in the longer term, the Armenian government may act in its national interests and prefer economic development rather than political nationalism.
But Turkey's initiative to normalize its relations with Armenia risks ruining Baku's strategic planning and brings new uncertainties into the regional dynamics. The Azerbaijani government also fears that the Turkish-Armenian cooperation will alter the fragile balance of power within the region and might even provoke Armenia to pursue further military action.
At the same time, the Turkish-Armenian border issue also has important symbolic meaning. Turkey closed its border at the start of the Karabakh conflict, due to Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijani territory. Renouncing that symbolic but powerful gesture of support could diminish Turkey's image within the region. An Azerbaijani Member of Parliament (MP) Sabir Rustamkhanli, told EDM on April 9 that he believed Turkey is being pressured by outside powers to re-open the border with Armenia, because "external forces" wanted to humiliate Turkey and show that it can yield under pressure.
In the aftermath of Obama's statement on April 24, the Azerbaijani government's top priority is to foster dialogue with Turkey and ensure that policies are coordinated between the two strategic allies -avoiding any negative consequences to upset their bilateral relations. In this context, Azerbaijani officials have been privately complaining that they lack full information about Turkish intentions, and they fear that details are being deliberately concealed. In fact, the so-called "road map," signed by the Turkish and Armenian Presidents has not been shown to the Azerbaijani authorities. Asim Mollazade, MP and the leader of the Party for Democratic Reforms, expressed his outrage about the confidentiality of the talks between Turkey and Armenia. "We were not informed about these talks. We learned about them from other sources," said Mollazade (www.1news.az. April 30). It is expected that Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's forthcoming trip to Baku will address some of these concerns.
On the other hand, Azerbaijani officials recognize that there have been some positive results stemming from these recent developments: the growing interest of the international community in this region and specifically in seeking to find a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, as well as the sudden realization that Azerbaijan and Turkey must constantly work to improve their bilateral relations. Public outreach in this respect is a prerequisite, Azerbaijani officials believe. In mid-April a group of Azerbaijani parliamentarians traveled to Turkey to deliver this message from Azerbaijan. A similar message was conveyed by Turkish parliamentarians in Baku. Both countries will increase their public diplomacy in order to avoid any future misunderstandings similar to those experienced in relation to the anxiety triggered over Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.
--Fariz Ismailzade
Erdogan Reshuffles the Turkish Cabinet
On May 1, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced major revisions in his cabinet. While some ministers retained their posts, eight were removed and nine new members were brought into the cabinet, with another seven assigned to different positions (Today's Zaman, May 2). The poor showing of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the local elections, growing criticism toward the government's handling of the global financial crisis and concerns about the performance of individual ministers had prompted the discussions on revisions within the cabinet (EDM, April 1).
After several weeks of speculation over Erdogan choice of new ministers, the announcement of the cabinet reshuffle sparked mixed reactions among political observers and opposition parties. Whereas some changes were expected, others came as a surprise. In revising the cabinet, Erdogan allegedly took into account President Gul's preferences, reactions from the opposition and the expectations of the AKP's grassroots support (Tercuman, May 3).
Of the ministers who were removed from the cabinet, the most remarkable names were Education Minister Huseyin Celik, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Hilmi Guler, Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Sahin and Minister of State Kursad Tuzmen. Although Erdogan argued that those who lost their posts were not being punished for the party's failings, the exclusion of some ministers suggests that concerns over policy as well as other controversies had played a role in the cabinet reshuffle. By excluding Celik from the cabinet, for instance, despite his strong position within the party, Erdogan demonstrated his sensitivity to recent criticism.
Nonetheless, Erdogan was not completely swayed by external feedback while reshuffling his cabinet. He did not bow to pressure to remove other ministers -most notably the Culture Minister Ertugrul Gunay, who was criticized by the opposition and the AKP's supporters. Gunay had occasionally contradicted the government's stance on critical issues and failed to satisfy the party grassroots' expectations. Similarly, Erdogan kept the Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek, viewed by reformists as the stumbling block to the further democratization of the country given his nationalist views. Likewise, although the minister responsible for the treasury, Mehmet Simsek, had been under fire from business circles for his mismanagement of the economy, Erdogan did not exclude Simsek from his economic team; instead naming him as the Finance Minister to replace Kemal Unakitan -whose health necessitated the change.
In another bold move, Erdogan appointed Bulent Arinc as one of his deputy prime ministers. Arinc, one of the three leading founders of the AKP -along with Erdogan and Gul- served as the parliamentary speaker during the AKP's first term between 2002 and 2007. Because of his alleged commitment to the party's past Islamist ideals, Arinc had always been at the center of discussions and his controversial statements on secularism as well as his criticism of the military occasionally raised tension within Turkish politics. Arinc was not given any active government post during the AKP's second term since 2007 partly due to Erdogan's attempt to avoid political polemics and allay the concerns of secularists. Now that Arinc is in the cabinet and will attend the meetings of the National Security Council, his attitudes towards the military will come under greater scrutiny. He said he had reflected on his shortcomings and mistakes over the past two years, but he does not see any need to change either his views or style (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 2).
Another surprising choice was Professor Ahmet Davutoglu who was appointed as the Foreign Minister from outside parliament. Davutoglu had been serving as the chief advisor to the Prime Minister in foreign affairs and is known as the leading figure behind Turkey's new foreign policy doctrine. He takes over from Ali Babacan, who was named as the new minister for the economy. Babacan was considered by many to be unfit to handle Turkey's heavy foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, in addition to serving as the intellectual architect of the AKP's foreign policy, Davutoglu has been personally involved in the day-to-day conduct of Turkey's foreign relations -particularly in the Middle East (Aksam, May 3). Davutoglu's appointment had therefore been expected and was welcomed by many in Ankara, since it might promote more effective management of the foreign ministry, by making him responsible for the policies he has helped to formulate.
On May 2 Davutoglu outlined the broad parameters of his perspectives on foreign policy. He emphasized that he will continue his work toward making Turkey an influential power that can set the agenda in the surrounding regions. "We will move from a crisis-oriented approach to a vision-oriented approach," Davutoglu added (Anadolu Ajansi, May 2).
Erdogan moved Babacan to a position for which he might be more suited. The government had come under criticism for its failure to stop the rapid contraction of the Turkish economy as a result of the global financial crisis. Earlier, Erdogan had announced that he would restructure the economy under a more effective administration. By tasking Babacan with overseeing all economic and financial institutions including the state banks, making him a type of "super minister," Erdogan has expressed his desire to manage the economy more effectively (Star, May 2).
It is too early to assess the implications of the revised cabinet for Turkish politics, given that different considerations played a role in the selection of ministers. The newly appointed ministers promised that they will implement new projects (www.ntvmsnbc.com, May 3). For some analysts, the reshuffling might indeed herald a new era and bring about more effective governance (Radikal, May 3). For others, there are no grounds to expect a shift in the AKP's policies, and on the contrary the political orientation of the new cabinet members suggests that the AKP might revert back to its Islamist past (Hurriyet, May 2, Birgun, May 3).
--Saban Kardas
