Roberto Abraham Scaruffi

Sunday, 3 January 2016

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2016-01-02 | NO.2 epaper |
Note to Readers
Dear readers,

This issue of "Best of 2015 TSR Weekly Reports" collects some of the most important debates and informative analyses on matters implicating Taiwan's security that took place or were published in the past year. We hope it provides a handy way to recollect 2015 as readers anticipate 2016. The TSR team appreciates readers' support in the past year and wishes readers all the success in 2016!
South China Sea Disputes
Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South China Sea (2015-06-02)
(The National Interest, By Michael D. Swaine) To clarify its position, the U.S. needs to focus like a laser on its two only real interests in the South China Sea, and connect its statements and actions to them as much as possible.

Regaining the Initiative in the South China Sea (2015-08-05)
(The Diplomat, By Col Michael W. “Starbaby” Pietrucha) If we are to successfully execute a Wolverine Strategy, we will have to do something about both our air advisory capability and our stable of available aircraft.
Think Again: Myths and Myopia about the South China Sea (2015-10-16)
(The National Interest, By Alexander Vuving) If the Chinese Navy becomes the custodian of nautical freedom in these waters, most vessels, most of the time, can still sail through them unhindered, but that is not because nations enjoy the objective right of free access, but because they enjoy China’s subjective benevolence, which at times can be selective and arbitrary.
Diaoyutai Disputes Resurface and Japan Policy
The Japan Dilemma: Asia's Next Geopolitical Nightmare? (2015-04-26)
(The National Interests, By Ted Galen Carpenter) Washington may end up with a more assertive ally that antagonizes China, South Korea, and perhaps other neighboring states but continues to depend on the United States to achieve its enhanced ambitions. 
U.S. “Pivot” to Asia and Sino-U.S. Engagement
A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China (2015-04-14)
(National Interest, By Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis) The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia. Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically opposed and mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in Asia.
Where Do We Draw the Line on Balancing China? (2015-04-27)
(Foreign Policy, By Stephen M. Walt) From Beijing’s perspective, a deteriorating relationship with Washington is something to be avoided, especially when Chinese exports to the United States are about twice as large (as a percentage of GDP) as U.S. exports to China. Both countries have an interest in maintaining mutually beneficial economic ties, but China needs them even more than the United States does. 
At a Crossroads: What Is the Future of U.S.-China Relations? (2015-05-21)
(The National Interest, By Elizabeth C. Economy) Three recent, thoughtful reports/papers by Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, Kevin Rudd, and Michael Swaine, respectively, attempt to address the question of future Sino-U.S. relations. Each adopts a different approach and arrives at different conclusions.
Can the U.S. and China Get Along? (2015-07-12)
(New York Times, By Orville Schell) The U.S. should reaffirm in the most public way possible that while we welcome China’s “rise,” we will not accommodate unreasonable claims around the world and, if necessary, are even prepared for a latter-day strategy of “containment.” However, at the same time, we must make it indelibly clear that we far prefer a collaborative path forward. Such a path needs a road map, and a personal presidential commitment.
A Grand Economic Strategy for Dealing with China (2015-07-23)
(Foreign Policy, By Jeffrey E. Garten) In the case of the RMB and the SDR, the box needs to be bigger than what might seem natural because the internationalization of China’s currency will overtime transform global finance, and global finance is the circulatory system of the world economy. I’d advise the United States not to fight the RMB/SDR issue. Let China in this year. But the issue could be used as a springboard for much bigger things.
The Impasse of US-China Relations (2015-10-16)
(The Diplomat, By David Lai) As this journey continues, the Chinese side will continue to press for mutual trust and respect; and insist that practical issues will go away if they have the strategic commitment from the United States. The U.S., however, always goes after specific problems in the two nations’ relations; and believes that trust and respect can only come from measurable cooperation. This journey will continue to be bumpy if the two nations continue to talk past each other with neither side willing to break the impasse.
Do Years Studying in America Change Chinese Hearts and Minds? (2015-12-07)
(Foreign Policy) Chinese students in the United States learn much from the contrasts between America’s education system, media, and social and intellectual life and those they find at home. And they often emerge with more admiration for the United States as a result. But they also gain more respect for the enormity of the task involved in running China — and learn that America’s streets aren’t exactly paved with gold.
The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan (2015-06-24)
(The National Interest, By Denny Roy) The case for abandoning Taiwan typically meets at least three large barriers: the betrayal of U.S. ideals, harm to America’s reputation as a reliable security partner, and Taiwan’s strategic value.
Rebalancing Taiwan-U.S. Relations (2015-12-06)
(Survival 57(6), By Nien-chung Chang Liao and Dalton Lin) In recent years, a number of prominent American experts have begun to question the wisdom of U.S. long-term security commitment to Taiwan. Careful examination of these ‘abandonist’ arguments indicates that the real issue concerning Taiwan-U.S. relations is how Taipei can breathe new life into its relations with Washington while continuing to improve ties with Beijing. 
DPP Searches for New China Stance; Cross-Strait Issues
‘1992 Consensus’ the Core of Cross-Strait Relations: Xi (2015-03-05)
(China Post) Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping said yesterday at the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that the cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan is based on the foundation of the “1992 Consensus.”

Doubts Grow Over ‘1992 Consensus’ (2015-03-13)
(Taipei Times, By Fan Shih-ping) Since Ma’s re-election in 2012, Beijing has gradually moved from the “1992 consensus” toward the “one China” framework, emphasizing that both Taiwan and China are parts of one country.
Taiwan and Mainland Leaders Meet for First Time (2015-11-04)
(Douglas Paal, By Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) A “two leaders” meeting will be a very high bar for Tsai to jump to maintain the status quo, as she has pledged to do. This could give Beijing greater leverage to decide what basis for the relationship is good enough, if it is not to be based on the “1992 consensus” that prevails under Ma, as Tsai in the past has insisted it will not be.
The Strategic Intentions Behind Xi Jinping's Meeting with Ma Ying-jeou (2015-11-07)
(South China Morning Post, By Jonathan Sullivan) Despite the exigencies of political competition and the heightened sense of drama that accompanies Taiwan's hard-fought elections, there is actually a high degree of consensus on Taiwan's status - functional autonomy within the framework of the ROC with future endpoints still to be decided.
What the Historic Ma-Xi Meeting Could Mean for Cross-Strait Relations (2015-11-09)
(Brookings, By Richard C. Bush III) Xi seeks to set the basic terms of future cross-Strait relations in ways that Tsai cannot accept and demonizes her and her party for being the “Taiwan independence force.” Does he understand that he may be strengthening Tsai’s position rather than weakening it? Tsai speaks of democracy, transparency, and sustaining the status quo, but only in general terms. Is she willing to run risks for Taiwan if Xi means what he says?
The Cross-Strait Meeting’s Lasting Impact (2015-11-09)
(Foreign Policy, By Jerome A. Cohen) Ma-Xi summit was not a “game changer” like the breakthrough 1972 meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese ruler Mao Zedong. Nor did it chart a new direction in bilateral relations comparable to the recent American move to break the long stalemate with Cuba. Nevertheless, the summit will have significant impacts on domestic public opinion within Taiwan and the mainland, as well as the structure of cross-strait relations moving forward.
The Real Reason the Xi-Ma Meeting Was Hisotric (2015-11-09)
(The Diplomat, By Zheng Wang) For Xi, this is in fact a meeting to say farewell to the one-China KMT and a meeting to prepare for working with a new Taiwan. Even though Xi has the power to keep greater restrictions on Taiwan, the major identity transformation will make Taiwan a definite new trouble for Beijing.
What Does the Ma-Xi Meeting Mean for China, Taiwan and America? (2015-11-11)
(The Diplomat, By Shannon Tiezzi) Dr. Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, talks with The Diplomat about the ramifications the Ma-Xi meeting will have for cross-strait relations, as well as for China, Taiwan, and even the United States.
US Should ‘Openly’ Declares Its Intent to Defend Taiwan from China: Think Tank (2015-07-28)
(Taipei Times, By William Lowther) A new commentary published by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies said the US should declare “openly and unequivocally” that it will defend Taiwan against any Chinese coercion or aggression.
Related:
-Response to PacNet #41 “Tough Times Ahead If the DPP Returns to Power?” (PacNet #41R, By Joseph A. Bosco)
-Xi Jinping's Great Game: Are China and Taiwan Headed Towards Trouble? (The National Interests, By Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello)
China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition (2016-12-29)
(The Diplomat, By Douglas Paal) The impending elections in Taiwan have the potential to lead to strains at all three corners of the Taiwan-U.S.-China triangle for the first time in over seven years. Parallel interests in all three leaderships do not fundamentally clash, leaving space for careful and creative management of the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough suspicion and mistrust across the Taiwan Strait that a vicious circle of action and reaction cannot be ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy prevention.
PLA and Military Balance
Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention (2015-01-26)
(Washington Quarterly, By M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey) Identifying “counter-intervention” as the focus of China's military strategy, and attributing it to Chinese sources, sustains a flawed assessment of China's military modernization, mistaking an operational concept for a military strategy or even a grand strategy aimed at pushing the United States out of the Asian littoral.
China: Exit Counter-Intervention, Enter Peripheral Defense (2015-03-04)
(The Diplomat, By Michael Carl Haas) China’s focus on countering a U.S. military intervention along its periphery is alive and well.

China's Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy (2015-04-16)
(China Brief 15(8), Jamestown Foundation, By Joe McReynolds) The SMS is a particularly valuable resource for understanding China’s evolving strategic approach to network warfare. A study that aims to be as comprehensive as the SMS cannot afford to ignore network warfare due to the centrality of information warfare to modern war-fighting, and the process by which the SMS is written ensures that the information analysts receive on network warfare represents something approaching an authoritative consensus within the PLA.
China's Military Blueprint: Bigger Navy, Bigger Global Role (2015-05-26)
(Foreign Policy, By Keith Johnson) China's first-ever defense white paper codifies the ongoing transformation of China into a true maritime power, and puts more emphasis on high-seas, offensive naval operations. More broadly, it envisions a much bigger, global role for Chinese armed forces than had previously been the case.
Taiwan's Domestic Issues and Foreign Relations
Taiwan's Latest Bone of Contention: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2015-04-24)
(Foreign Policy Research Institute, By Shelley Rigger) Remaining outside the AIIB was likely not a viable choice for Taiwan, which seeks to participate in as many regional and international organizations as possible. Still, the way the decision was made and communicated reinforced the Ma administration’s reputation for hasty, top-down decision-making.
China's Rise and Its Domestic Issues
The Coming Chinese Crackup (2015-03-06)
(Wall Street Journal, By David Shambaugh) The endgame of communist rule in China has begun, and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking point.

No, China's Not about to Collapse
 (2015-03-13)
(The Diplomat, By Timothy Heath) When weighing the party’s political liabilities against its assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of imminent collapse. Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the persistent political liabilities.
When Will China's Government Collapse? (2015-03-13)
(Foreign Policy, By Ho-Fung Hung, Arthur R. Kroeber, Howard W. French, and Suisheng Zhao) The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun,” influential China scholar David Shambaugh wrote in a March 7 article in the Wall Street Journal. “And it has progressed further than many think.” Is the ruling China’s Communist Party (CCP) on the brink of collapse? We asked several China hands for their take.
Q. and A.: David Shambaugh on the Risks to Chinese Communist Rule (2015-03-15)
(Sinosphere, By Chris Buckley) Some experts have endorsed Prof. Shambaugh's view that China’s outward order and prosperity mask profound risks for the ruling party. Others have argued that the party is more robust, politically and economically, than Prof. Shambaugh asserts. In an interview, he answered some questions raised by his essay.
Q. and A.: Zhang Weiwei on Why China Will Succeed under the Communist Party (2015-06-12)
(Sinosphere, By Didi Kirsten Tatlow) With the rise of China, Xi Jinping has gone from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity on a number of key issues [such as the South China Sea]. This is based on self-confidence, and also reflects the new consensus reached within China that, with the rise of China, the country should be more proactive in its strategic and foreign policy.
The Fragility of the Global Financial Order (2015-03-03)
(Wall Street Journal, By Mark Dubowitz and Jonathan Schanzer) The combination of an alternative global-reserve asset, a Chinese global credit card, an alternative Swift system backed by Russia and China, and a number of banks willing to defy the global financial order, could represent a significant challenge to U.S. interests.

Xi Jinping's Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics (2015-03-19)
(China Leadership Monitor No. 46, Hoover Institution, By Michael D. Swaine) Xi’s speech redefined and expanded the function of Chinese diplomacy, presenting it as an instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of an ambitious, long-term and more strategic foreign policy agenda. Ultimately, this suggests that Beijing will increasingly attempt to alter some of the foreign policy processes and power relationships that have defined the political, military, and economic environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

If the West Is Serious about the AIIB (2015-03-30)
(Wall Street Journal, By Curtis S. Chin) Western members such as Britain and Germany claim they will work from the inside to establish an institution that is cleaner, more efficient and more transparent than it might otherwise be. If they are sincere, here is what they need to remember.
China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ Project and Its International Relations (2015-10-18)
(The Carter Center, By Dalton Lin) China's "One Belt, One Road" project, if successfully carried out, would create a preliminary Sino-centric international system. However, letting South China Sea disputes hinder the project's progress in Southeast Asia and making Central Asia and Pakistan instead as the project's focus, China risks missing the piece where the project could make the most profound impacts.
China's Renminbi Is Approved by I.M.F. As a Main World Currency (2015-12-01)
(New York Times, By Keith Bradsher) As the renminbi becomes more deeply woven into the global economy, it undermines the ability of the West to impose financial sanctions on countries accused of human rights abuses and other violations, like Sudan and North Korea.
China's Naked Emperor (2015-07-31)
(New York Times, By Paul Krugman) In and of itself, the price of Chinese equities shouldn’t matter all that much. But the authorities have chosen to put their credibility on the line by trying to control that market — and are in the process of demonstrating that, China’s remarkable success over the past 25 years notwithstanding, the nation’s rulers have no idea what they’re doing.
Debating China's Rebalancing (2015-08-07)
(Brookings, By Cheng Li, David Daokui Li, and Malan Rietveld)Two leading analysts of China’s economic and political leadership, Professor David Daokui Li of Tsinghua University and Dr. Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution, discuss issues about China's economic reform with Malan Rietveld, director of Investec Asset Management’s Investment Institute.
The Insecurity Underpinning Xi Jinping's Repression  (2015-09-23)
(Washington Post, By Jerome A. Cohen) Xi Jinping will have to ask himself, as the insecure dictators of Taiwan and South Korea asked themselves 30 years ago: How long can any modernizing authoritarian regime rely on repression to cope with the mounting problems magnified by the very economic and social progress it has promoted.
Interview: Benjamin Elman (2015-12-10)
(The Diplomat, By Emanuel Pastreich) Japan’s wariness of China and Korea is an indication of the profound shifts going on. The “rise of China” narrative can be read in different ways, and for Japan it is a challenge. For Korea it is an opportunity to return to a prominence it has not had in many centuries.
TSR's Own Production
TSR Interview with Andrew Nathan (2015-02-20)
(Taiwan Security Research, By Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian McGuire talks with Andrew Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, about human rights issues in cross-Strait relations, Professor Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s book China’s Search for Security, and more in this TSR exclusive interview. 

TSR Interview with Ji-Jen Hwang
 (2015-03-24)
(Taiwan Security Research, By Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian McGuire talks with Ji-Jen Hwang, a visiting fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former associate professor at the Institute of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Taiwan, about China’s cyber warfare, “internet sovereignty”, and more in this TSR interview.

TSR Interview with Peiter Bottelier
 (2015-06-17)
(TSR, Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian McGuire speaks with Pieter Bottelier, Senior Adjunct Professor of China Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and former Chief of the World Bank's Resident Mission in Beijing, about China’s motivations for initiating AIIB, the significance of the AIIB Charter, and more in this TSR interview.

Contact: Dalton Lin, Executive Editor
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