|
| |
Note
to Readers
| |
| |
Dear readers,
This issue of "Best of 2015 TSR Weekly Reports"
collects some of the most important debates and informative analyses on matters
implicating Taiwan's security that took place or were published in the past
year. We hope it provides a handy way to recollect 2015 as readers anticipate
2016. The TSR team appreciates readers' support in the past year and wishes
readers all the success in 2016!
| |
| |
South
China Sea Disputes
| |
| |
Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South China
Sea (2015-06-02) (The
National Interest, By Michael D. Swaine) To clarify its position, the U.S. needs
to focus like a laser on its two only real interests in the South China Sea, and
connect its statements and actions to them as much as
possible.
Regaining the Initiative in the South China Sea (2015-08-05) (The
Diplomat, By Col Michael W. “Starbaby” Pietrucha) If we are to successfully
execute a Wolverine Strategy, we will have to do something about both our air
advisory capability and our stable of available aircraft. Think Again: Myths and Myopia about the South China
Sea (2015-10-16) (The
National Interest, By Alexander Vuving) If the Chinese Navy becomes the
custodian of nautical freedom in these waters, most vessels, most of the time,
can still sail through them unhindered, but that is not because nations enjoy
the objective right of free access, but because they enjoy China’s subjective
benevolence, which at times can be selective and arbitrary.
| |
| |
Diaoyutai
Disputes Resurface and Japan Policy
| |
| |
The Japan Dilemma: Asia's Next Geopolitical
Nightmare? (2015-04-26) (The
National Interests, By Ted Galen Carpenter) Washington may end up with a more
assertive ally that antagonizes China, South Korea, and perhaps other
neighboring states but continues to depend on the United States to achieve its
enhanced ambitions.
| |
| |
U.S.
“Pivot” to Asia and Sino-U.S. Engagement
| |
| |
A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China (2015-04-14) (National
Interest, By Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis) The fundamental problem
in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia.
Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and
domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically opposed and
mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in
Asia. Where Do We Draw the Line on Balancing China? (2015-04-27) (Foreign
Policy, By Stephen M. Walt) From Beijing’s perspective, a deteriorating
relationship with Washington is something to be avoided, especially when Chinese
exports to the United States are about twice as large (as a percentage of GDP)
as U.S. exports to China. Both countries have an interest in maintaining
mutually beneficial economic ties, but China needs them even more than the
United States does. At a Crossroads: What Is the Future of U.S.-China
Relations? (2015-05-21) (The
National Interest, By Elizabeth C. Economy) Three recent, thoughtful
reports/papers by Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, Kevin Rudd, and Michael
Swaine, respectively, attempt to address the question of future Sino-U.S.
relations. Each adopts a different approach and arrives at different
conclusions. Can the U.S. and China Get Along? (2015-07-12) (New
York Times, By Orville Schell) The U.S. should reaffirm in the most public way
possible that while we welcome China’s “rise,” we will not accommodate
unreasonable claims around the world and, if necessary, are even prepared for a
latter-day strategy of “containment.” However, at the same time, we must make it
indelibly clear that we far prefer a collaborative path forward. Such a path
needs a road map, and a personal presidential commitment. A Grand Economic Strategy for Dealing with China (2015-07-23) (Foreign
Policy, By Jeffrey E. Garten) In the case of the RMB and the SDR, the box needs
to be bigger than what might seem natural because the internationalization of
China’s currency will overtime transform global finance, and global finance is
the circulatory system of the world economy. I’d advise the United States not to
fight the RMB/SDR issue. Let China in this year. But the issue could be used as
a springboard for much bigger things. The Impasse of US-China Relations (2015-10-16) (The
Diplomat, By David Lai) As this journey continues, the Chinese side will
continue to press for mutual trust and respect; and insist that practical issues
will go away if they have the strategic commitment from the United States. The
U.S., however, always goes after specific problems in the two nations’
relations; and believes that trust and respect can only come from measurable
cooperation. This journey will continue to be bumpy if the two nations continue
to talk past each other with neither side willing to break the
impasse. Do Years Studying in America Change Chinese Hearts and
Minds? (2015-12-07) (Foreign
Policy) Chinese students in the United States learn much from the contrasts
between America’s education system, media, and social and intellectual life and
those they find at home. And they often emerge with more admiration for the
United States as a result. But they also gain more respect for the enormity of
the task involved in running China — and learn that America’s streets aren’t
exactly paved with gold. The Impossible Price of a U.S.-China Grand Bargain: Dumping
Taiwan (2015-06-24) (The
National Interest, By Denny Roy) The case for abandoning Taiwan typically meets
at least three large barriers: the betrayal of U.S. ideals, harm to America’s
reputation as a reliable security partner, and Taiwan’s strategic
value. Rebalancing Taiwan-U.S. Relations (2015-12-06) (Survival
57(6), By Nien-chung Chang Liao and Dalton Lin) In recent years, a number of
prominent American experts have begun to question the wisdom of U.S. long-term
security commitment to Taiwan. Careful examination of these ‘abandonist’
arguments indicates that the real issue concerning Taiwan-U.S. relations is how
Taipei can breathe new life into its relations with Washington while continuing
to improve ties with Beijing.
| |
| |
DPP
Searches for New China Stance; Cross-Strait Issues
| |
| |
‘1992 Consensus’ the Core of Cross-Strait Relations:
Xi (2015-03-05) (China
Post) Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping said yesterday at the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that the cross-strait
relationship between China and Taiwan is based on the foundation of the “1992
Consensus.”
Doubts Grow Over ‘1992 Consensus’ (2015-03-13) (Taipei
Times, By Fan Shih-ping) Since Ma’s re-election in 2012, Beijing has gradually
moved from the “1992 consensus” toward the “one China” framework, emphasizing
that both Taiwan and China are parts of one country. Taiwan and Mainland Leaders Meet for First Time (2015-11-04) (Douglas
Paal, By Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) A “two leaders” meeting
will be a very high bar for Tsai to jump to maintain the status quo, as she has
pledged to do. This could give Beijing greater leverage to decide what basis for
the relationship is good enough, if it is not to be based on the “1992
consensus” that prevails under Ma, as Tsai in the past has insisted it will not
be. The Strategic Intentions Behind Xi Jinping's Meeting with Ma
Ying-jeou (2015-11-07) (South
China Morning Post, By Jonathan Sullivan) Despite the exigencies of political
competition and the heightened sense of drama that accompanies Taiwan's
hard-fought elections, there is actually a high degree of consensus on Taiwan's
status - functional autonomy within the framework of the ROC with future
endpoints still to be decided. What the Historic Ma-Xi Meeting Could Mean for Cross-Strait
Relations (2015-11-09) (Brookings,
By Richard C. Bush III) Xi seeks to set the basic terms of future cross-Strait
relations in ways that Tsai cannot accept and demonizes her and her party for
being the “Taiwan independence force.” Does he understand that he may be
strengthening Tsai’s position rather than weakening it? Tsai speaks of
democracy, transparency, and sustaining the status quo, but only in general
terms. Is she willing to run risks for Taiwan if Xi means what he
says? The Cross-Strait Meeting’s Lasting Impact (2015-11-09) (Foreign
Policy, By Jerome A. Cohen) Ma-Xi summit was not a “game changer” like the
breakthrough 1972 meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Chinese ruler
Mao Zedong. Nor did it chart a new direction in bilateral relations comparable
to the recent American move to break the long stalemate with Cuba. Nevertheless,
the summit will have significant impacts on domestic public opinion within
Taiwan and the mainland, as well as the structure of cross-strait relations
moving forward. The Real Reason the Xi-Ma Meeting Was Hisotric (2015-11-09) (The
Diplomat, By Zheng Wang) For Xi, this is in fact a meeting to say farewell to
the one-China KMT and a meeting to prepare for working with a new Taiwan. Even
though Xi has the power to keep greater restrictions on Taiwan, the major
identity transformation will make Taiwan a definite new trouble for
Beijing. What Does the Ma-Xi Meeting Mean for China, Taiwan and
America? (2015-11-11) (The
Diplomat, By Shannon Tiezzi) Dr. Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of
International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University,
talks with The Diplomat about the ramifications the Ma-Xi meeting will have for
cross-strait relations, as well as for China, Taiwan, and even the United
States. US Should ‘Openly’ Declares Its Intent to Defend Taiwan from China:
Think Tank (2015-07-28) (Taipei
Times, By William Lowther) A new commentary published by the Washington-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies said the US should declare
“openly and unequivocally” that it will defend Taiwan against any Chinese
coercion or aggression. Related: -Response to PacNet #41
“Tough Times Ahead If the DPP Returns to Power?” (PacNet
#41R, By Joseph A. Bosco) -Xi
Jinping's Great Game: Are China and Taiwan Headed Towards Trouble? (The
National Interests, By Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacqueline Vitello) China, the U.S. and the Coming Taiwan Transition (2016-12-29) (The
Diplomat, By Douglas Paal) The impending elections in Taiwan have the potential
to lead to strains at all three corners of the Taiwan-U.S.-China triangle for
the first time in over seven years. Parallel interests in all three leaderships
do not fundamentally clash, leaving space for careful and creative management of
the Taiwan political transition. But there is enough suspicion and mistrust
across the Taiwan Strait that a vicious circle of action and reaction cannot be
ruled out and probably should be subject to active policy prevention.
| |
| |
PLA
and Military Balance
| |
| |
Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese
Counter-Intervention (2015-01-26) (Washington
Quarterly, By M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey) Identifying
“counter-intervention” as the focus of China's military strategy, and
attributing it to Chinese sources, sustains a flawed assessment of China's
military modernization, mistaking an operational concept for a military strategy
or even a grand strategy aimed at pushing the United States out of the Asian
littoral. China: Exit Counter-Intervention, Enter Peripheral
Defense (2015-03-04) (The
Diplomat, By Michael Carl Haas) China’s focus on countering a U.S. military
intervention along its periphery is alive and well.
China's Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the
Science of Military Strategy (2015-04-16) (China
Brief 15(8), Jamestown Foundation, By Joe McReynolds) The SMS is a particularly
valuable resource for understanding China’s evolving strategic approach to
network warfare. A study that aims to be as comprehensive as the SMS cannot
afford to ignore network warfare due to the centrality of information warfare to
modern war-fighting, and the process by which the SMS is written ensures that
the information analysts receive on network warfare represents something
approaching an authoritative consensus within the PLA. China's Military Blueprint: Bigger Navy, Bigger Global
Role (2015-05-26) (Foreign
Policy, By Keith Johnson) China's
first-ever defense white paper codifies
the ongoing transformation of China into a true maritime power, and puts more
emphasis on high-seas, offensive naval operations. More broadly, it envisions a
much bigger, global role for Chinese armed forces than had previously been the
case.
| |
| |
Taiwan's
Domestic Issues and Foreign Relations
| |
| |
Taiwan's Latest Bone of Contention: The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (2015-04-24) (Foreign
Policy Research Institute, By Shelley Rigger) Remaining outside the AIIB was
likely not a viable choice for Taiwan, which seeks to participate in as many
regional and international organizations as possible. Still, the way the
decision was made and communicated reinforced the Ma administration’s reputation
for hasty, top-down decision-making.
| |
| |
China's
Rise and Its Domestic Issues
| |
| |
The Coming Chinese Crackup (2015-03-06) (Wall
Street Journal, By David Shambaugh) The endgame of communist rule in China has
begun, and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer
to a breaking point.
No, China's Not about to Collapse (2015-03-13) (The
Diplomat, By Timothy Heath) When weighing the party’s political liabilities
against its assets, therefore, the evidence suggests that the CCP faces little
danger of imminent collapse. Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and
responsiveness, combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese
and the lack of a compelling alternative outweigh the persistent political
liabilities. When Will China's Government Collapse? (2015-03-13) (Foreign
Policy, By Ho-Fung Hung, Arthur R. Kroeber, Howard W. French, and Suisheng Zhao)
The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun,” influential China scholar
David Shambaugh wrote in a March 7 article in the Wall Street Journal. “And it
has progressed further than many think.” Is the ruling China’s Communist Party
(CCP) on the brink of collapse? We asked several China hands for their
take. Q. and A.: David Shambaugh on the Risks to Chinese Communist
Rule (2015-03-15) (Sinosphere,
By Chris Buckley) Some experts have endorsed Prof. Shambaugh's view that China’s
outward order and prosperity mask profound risks for the ruling party. Others
have argued that the party is more robust, politically and economically, than
Prof. Shambaugh asserts. In an interview, he answered some questions raised by
his essay. Q. and A.: Zhang Weiwei on Why China Will Succeed under the
Communist Party (2015-06-12) (Sinosphere,
By Didi Kirsten Tatlow) With the rise of China, Xi Jinping has gone from
strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity on a number of key issues [such as the
South China Sea]. This is based on self-confidence, and also reflects the new
consensus reached within China that, with the rise of China, the country should
be more proactive in its strategic and foreign policy. The Fragility of the Global Financial Order (2015-03-03) (Wall
Street Journal, By Mark Dubowitz and Jonathan Schanzer) The combination of an
alternative global-reserve asset, a Chinese global credit card, an alternative
Swift system backed by Russia and China, and a number of banks willing to defy
the global financial order, could represent a significant challenge to U.S.
interests.
Xi
Jinping's Address to the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs:
Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics (2015-03-19) (China
Leadership Monitor No. 46, Hoover Institution, By Michael D. Swaine) Xi’s speech
redefined and expanded the function of Chinese diplomacy, presenting it as an
instrument for the effective application of Chinese power in support of an
ambitious, long-term and more strategic foreign policy agenda. Ultimately, this
suggests that Beijing will increasingly attempt to alter some of the foreign
policy processes and power relationships that have defined the political,
military, and economic environment in the Asia-Pacific region.
If the West Is Serious about the AIIB (2015-03-30) (Wall
Street Journal, By Curtis S. Chin) Western members such as Britain and Germany
claim they will work from the inside to establish an institution that is
cleaner, more efficient and more transparent than it might otherwise be. If they
are sincere, here is what they need to remember. China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ Project and Its International
Relations (2015-10-18) (The
Carter Center, By Dalton Lin) China's "One Belt,
One Road" project,
if successfully carried out, would create a preliminary Sino-centric
international system. However, letting South China Sea disputes hinder the
project's progress in Southeast Asia and making Central Asia and Pakistan
instead as the project's focus, China risks missing the piece where the project
could make the most profound impacts. China's Renminbi Is Approved by I.M.F. As a Main World
Currency (2015-12-01) (New
York Times, By Keith Bradsher) As the renminbi becomes more deeply woven into
the global economy, it undermines the ability of the West to impose financial
sanctions on countries accused of human rights abuses and other violations, like
Sudan and North Korea. China's Naked Emperor (2015-07-31) (New
York Times, By Paul Krugman) In and of itself, the price of Chinese equities
shouldn’t matter all that much. But the authorities have chosen to put their
credibility on the line by trying to control that market — and are in the
process of demonstrating that, China’s remarkable success over the past 25 years
notwithstanding, the nation’s rulers have no idea what they’re
doing. Debating China's Rebalancing (2015-08-07) (Brookings,
By Cheng Li, David Daokui Li, and Malan Rietveld)Two leading analysts of China’s
economic and political leadership, Professor David Daokui Li of Tsinghua
University and Dr. Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution, discuss issues about
China's economic reform with Malan Rietveld, director of Investec Asset
Management’s Investment Institute. The Insecurity Underpinning Xi Jinping's
Repression (2015-09-23) (Washington
Post, By Jerome A. Cohen) Xi Jinping will have to ask himself, as the insecure
dictators of Taiwan and South Korea asked themselves 30 years ago: How long can
any modernizing authoritarian regime rely on repression to cope with the
mounting problems magnified by the very economic and social progress it has
promoted. Interview: Benjamin Elman (2015-12-10) (The
Diplomat, By Emanuel Pastreich) Japan’s wariness of China and Korea is an
indication of the profound shifts going on. The “rise of China” narrative can be
read in different ways, and for Japan it is a challenge. For Korea it is an
opportunity to return to a prominence it has not had in many centuries.
| |
| |
TSR's
Own Production
| |
| |
TSR Interview with Andrew Nathan (2015-02-20) (Taiwan
Security Research, By Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian
McGuire talks with Andrew Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science
at Columbia University, about human rights issues in cross-Strait relations,
Professor Nathan and Andrew Scobell’s book China’s Search for Security, and more
in this TSR exclusive interview.
TSR Interview with Ji-Jen Hwang (2015-03-24) (Taiwan
Security Research, By Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian
McGuire talks with Ji-Jen Hwang, a visiting fellow with the Freeman Chair in
China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former
associate professor at the Institute of Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University in Taiwan, about China’s cyber warfare, “internet
sovereignty”, and more in this TSR interview.
TSR Interview with Peiter Bottelier (2015-06-17) (TSR,
Kristian McGuire) Taiwan Security Research’s Kristian McGuire speaks with Pieter
Bottelier, Senior Adjunct Professor of China Studies at Johns Hopkins
University’s School of Advanced International Studies and former Chief of the
World Bank's Resident Mission in Beijing, about China’s motivations for
initiating AIIB, the significance of the AIIB Charter, and more in
this TSR
interview.
Contact:
Dalton Lin, Executive Editor
| |
|
|
|