INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
Lebanon’s Trial by Fire
Beirut/Brussels, 2 December 2010: An intra-Lebanese deal on
how to respond to forthcoming indictments by the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (STL) is necessary to avoid a breakdown of the country’s
precarious balance of power, even as the STL pursues its work.
Trial by Fire: The Politics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,*
the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the
political crisis surrounding the body dealing with the 2005
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. There is increasing
speculation it will indict Hizbollah members, and the movement has
promised swift reaction should the government not dissociate itself from
the tribunal. Although taking dramatic steps would hurt its reputation,
Hizbollah, having warned of catastrophe, can ill afford to do nothing.
On the other hand, for Hariri to comply with this demand would
represent a devastating personal and political blow, at worst paving the
way for violent action by aggrieved Sunni groups. The report recommends
a compromise that places the indictments in the public domain;
preserves Hariri’s credibility without provoking Hizbollah; and
perpetuates the 2008 truce negotiated in Doha.
“Any realistic way out would cost everyone something while
preserving what is essential”, says Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Iraq,
Syria & Lebanon Project Director. “Banking on Hizbollah’s tameness
or Hariri’s capitulation will only encourage the two sides to stick to
uncompromising positions that could push Lebanon to the brink”.
The probe was the product of political considerations that
continue to shape perceptions in Lebanon and beyond. Hizbollah and its
allies have embarked on a relentless campaign to discredit the tribunal.
Although indictments of movement members will resonate positively among
many, they will be viewed by its numerous sympathisers – who will point
to the long list of political assassinations in Lebanon and the region
for which there has been no investigation, let alone accountability – as
a purely political act.
For lack of other mediation efforts, the best hope for a soft
landing currently lies with a Saudi-Syrian initiative. A more
authentically Lebanese formula, hammered out by the opposing camps,
arguably would be healthier and more sustainable but is almost entirely
out of reach given relations between the two sides and their respective
strong reliance on Riyadh and Damascus.
Details on a possible deal remain murky, but several scenarios
are possible: Lebanon could request the Security Council to halt STL
activities once indictments have been issued, for the sake of domestic
stability. It could condition further cooperation with the tribunal on
its taking certain steps (e.g., foregoing the option of trials in
absentia; agreeing to look into Hizbollah’s “false witnesses” claim or
Israeli spy-ring affairs). Or cooperation could continue even as Lebanon
expressed serious doubts as to the basis of the STL’s findings. A
compromise should be accompanied by a collective agreement to allow the
prime minister to govern more effectively – something he systematically
has been prevented from doing.
Hizbollah's reputation has already been tarnished. Its domestic
detractors are once more showing their fecklessness and the huge
imbalance of power from which they suffer on the ground. Neither side
will easily remedy these facts of political life. Nor will the tribunal
achieve the loftier goals many projected onto it. “No winner will come
out of the current battle”, says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle
East & North Africa Program Director. “What is necessary is to
ensure the Lebanese people do not emerge as the biggest losers of all”.
