Obama's Foreign Policy Objectives: The Geopolitical Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia Mosaic
By Jack A. Smith
URL of this article: www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25077
You’ve seen the headlines in the last weeks and days:
The Arab uprisings, the killing of Osama Bin
Laden, Washington's efforts to keep troops in Afghanistan and Iraq
beyond pullout schedules, Egypt's reopening of the border with Gaza,
Pakistan's role in the Afghan war, President Barack Obama's speeches on
the Middle East and Israel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's
intransigence, the Fatah-Hamas unity moves and plans to gain UN
recognition of Palestinian statehood — and that's not the half of it.
Each event looms large in the mass media and in
political discourse, but each is only part of a much larger mosaic that
constitutes the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) and Central Asia
component of the Obama Administration's foreign and military strategy.
This component is Washington's top priority because
any significant deterioration of U.S. domination in MENA, and the
frustration of its ambitions in Central Asia — especially in combination
with weakening economic and political influence in the world — could
hasten America's decline as the unipolar global "leader," i.e., hegemon.
The U.S. inherited this position two decades ago upon
the implosion of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp and is hardly
prepared to step aside. The policy Washington adopted at that time, and
which remains in force today, is to prevent the emergence of any
powerful rival or military force potentially able to undermine American
dominion.
No other country is grabbing for the global
supremacy, but a number of states with advanced and developing economies
think it's time for a new international construct with multipolar
leadership.
The Obama Administration's sacrosanct mission, as
with earlier Washington governments, is to keep the political and
geographic ground gained by the U.S. in the 66 years since the end of
World War II, when it became leader of the capitalist world's Cold War
contention with communism.
This ground was extended in the post-Cold War period
mainly through U.S. control of global economic institutions, the
political absorption of the states of Eastern Europe that had been in
the Soviet orbit, unequaled military power, and for the last decade the
"war on terrorism" launched by former President George W. Bush.
President Barack Obama took over from Bush in Iraq,
greatly enlarged the Afghan war and extended fighting to western
Pakistan, Yemen and now Libya. In addition, Obama seeks to retain
smaller but substantial U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
years beyond their anticipated pullout dates at a time when public
opinion backs a total withdrawal.
Washington has had its eye on dominating MENA for its
energy resources for over 70 years and attracted several key regional
nations such as Saudi Arabia to its orbit many decades ago. In more
recent years, U.S. hegemony has been extended throughout the entire
region with the exception of Iran, the acquisition of which was
postponed because of the military-political debacle caused by the 2003
invasion of Iraq.
In the decade since 9/11 Washington lengthened its
imperial reach into Central Asia by projecting its formidable military
power into Afghanistan, one of the poorest countries on Earth. The
ostensible purpose was to capture bin Laden and defeat al Qaeda, the
organization he founded in the 1980s with support from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the U.S. during the civil war against a progressive
government in Kabul and its Soviet military protectors.
Washington's $10-billion-a-month Afghan foray has
become a military stalemate, but the adventure also allowed the U.S. to
plant its flag for the first time in Central Asia — a major geopolitical
advance, as we will explain. The Bush Administration was hardly unaware
of this fact when it chose to wage war in Afghanistan instead of
mounting an international police effort to apprehend bin Laden.
It is within this context of MENA/Central Asia
strategy that the May 2 slaying of bin Laden by a Navy SEALS killer-team
in Pakistan fits into the broader picture, as do the Iraq and Afghan
wars, settling the Israel-Palestine conflict, the U.S. attitude toward
the Arab uprisings and the other recent headlines regarding this region.
In domestic U.S. politics, the eradication of bin
Laden has generated a brief renewal of national self-confidence, and the
strengthening of Obama's "national security" credentials, leading to
elevated opinion poll ratings which the White House hopes will
contribute to his reelection victory next year.
Internationally, the removal of bin Laden will only
touch lightly upon most of the Obama Administration's immediate
foreign/military objectives. We will discuss some of these objectives
under these subheadings: The Arab Uprisings, Keeping the Troops in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and The Importance of Palestine.
••• THE ARAB UPRISINGS: First and foremost, the White
House is dedicated to co-opting, neutralizing or ending the progressive
uprisings taking place these last months against dictatorships and
oppressive monarchies throughout the Arab world.
Washington has extended its support to nearly all
these reactionary regimes for many decades, in return for which they
contentedly spin in America's hegemonic orbit. President Obama has
extended his belated rhetorical blessings upon the democratic trend, but
in actual practice all the White House has done is lead NATO into an
unjust war for regime change in Libya. [1]
The U.S. government supports democracy except when it
produces a government not to its liking or when a subject country
renounces Uncle Sam's jurisdiction or expresses opposition to America's
policies. President Obama does not want another Venezuela or Bolivia or
Brazil to take root in MENA and is working to insure that does not
happen, even though all were the products of democratic elections.
The Obama Administration seems no longer worried
about the successful popular Egyptian uprising because it brought about a
regime change that may only produce the form of democracy but not its
full content. The U.S. government, which supported and helped finance
the Mubarak dictatorship for over 30 years, is breathing easily because
its continuing relations with the powerful armed forces and the ruling
elite evidently insures that a democratic Egypt will remain within the
imperial fold. Tunisia, which initiated the popular struggle against
tyrants, also seems to have remained in Washington's camp even though
the long-term dictator they sent packing to Saudi Arabia was backed by
the U.S. to the end.
KEEPING TROOPS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: The
Obama Administration is anxious to retain military bases and thousands
of troops in Iraq, which it is supposed to leave entirely at the end of
this year, and in Afghanistan as well, when the U.S. is scheduled to
depart at the end of 2014. President Obama is applying heavy pressure to
Baghdad and Kabul to "request" the long-term presence of U.S. troops
and "contractors" after the bulk of the occupation force withdraws.
Why keep troops in Iraq? The neoconservative Bush
White House invaded Iraq, which was considered a pushover after 12 years
of U.S.-British-UN killer sanctions, not only to control its oil but as
a prelude to bringing about regime change in neighboring Iran, thus
providing Washington with total control of the immense resources of the
Persian Gulf. The Iraqi guerrilla resistance destroyed the plan, for
now.
Thus, the upshot of the war — in addition to costing
American taxpayers several trillion dollars over the next few decades in
principal and interest — is that Shi'ite Iran's main enemy, which was
the Sunni regime of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad until 2003, has been
replaced by the Shi'ite government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a
politician who usually bends the knee to Washington but is quite
friendly to Tehran, as are many Iraqi politicians. (The Shia are nearly
65% of the population; the Sunnis, nearly 35%.)
On May 16 Maliki declared that "Security, military
and political cooperation between Iran and Iraq is essential, and we
will certainly see the expansion of relations in these areas in the
future." Washington's big fear is that Maliki may eventually thumb his
nose at Uncle Sam, and that in time Iraq and Iran will draw much closer
together — a prospect deeply opposed by the U.S., Israel and Saudi
Arabia.
According to Stratfor, the private intelligence
resource, on April 26: "[T]he U.S. has reportedly offered to leave as
many as 20,000 troops in the country" after its "pullout" at the end of
this year. In addition, a large but undetermined number of "contractors"
— often paramilitary hirelings — are to remain.
Further, according to an Inter Press Service report
May 9, the State Department "intends to double its staff in Iraq to
nearly 16,000 and rely entirely on private contractors for security." So
large a staff is almost unbelievable, but so is the immense size of the
new U.S. embassy in Baghdad's Green Zone — the largest such facility in
the world.
Perhaps the most important obstacle to retaining
troops isn't Maliki , who may cave in to domestic or American pressure,
but the fighting cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army, which once
fought U.S. troops but has been quiet in recent years. Sadr threatens to
unleash the army to fight any occupation forces left behind. In making
his decision Maliki must keep in mind that it was the votes of the Sadr
forces that assured his election victory. The U.S. suggests Sadr is
doing Iran's bidding.
Washington has told Maliki he must make his decision
by August. There's lots of maneuvering going on, and which way he will
decide is unknown.
Why keep troops in Afghanistan? The Obama
Administration has several different reasons for seeking to retain a
reduced fighting force in Afghanistan, and it is applying increasing
pressure on its errant factotum in Kabul, President Hamid Karzai, to
sign a post-2014 Strategic Partnership Declaration that includes U.S.
troops and bases.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made oblique
reference to this "long-term framework for our bilateral cooperation" in
a Feb. 18 speech to the Asia Society: "In no way should our enduring
commitment be misunderstood as a desire by America and our allies to
occupy Afghanistan against the will of its people. We do not seek any
permanent military bases in their country."
In translation: Clinton indicted the U.S. was first
going to seek approval from the Afghan government, and that its need for
troops and bases would not last forever.
Washington is not without resources in this matter.
It's going to take up to $10 billion a year — which Kabul simply cannot
afford — to pay for the nearly 400,000 Afghan troops and police that the
Pentagon plans to have ready by the end of 2014. The money can only
come from Uncle Sam, and the possible price may be accepting America's
"enduring commitment."
According to a Reuters dispatch May 24, a "senior
U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity," told the British
news agency: "Our goal is to end the war in Afghanistan, bring our
troops home, leave behind enough capability to conduct CT
[counter-terrorism] operations and to sustain necessary support to the
local forces and Afghan state.... It remains a major, long-term U.S.
commitment." Here are some reasons why:
(1) The U.S. has been holding "secret talks" with the
conservative Islamic Taliban for months with the objective of reaching
an agreement that will bring the Taliban into the Kabul government and
perhaps in some provinces as well, under the authority of President
Karzai. The purpose is to end the 10-year stalemated war against the
Taliban and several fighting groups opposed to the American invasion,
and to convey the impression that it has achieved victory. But the White
House doesn't trust the Taliban, or Karzai for that matter, and wants
its own "boots on the ground" after the main force departs.
According to an April 18 article in the Financial
Times, the Obama Administration was so intent upon negotiating an
agreement with the Taliban that it "quietly dropped its precondition
that the Taliban sever links with al Qaeda and accept the Afghan
constitution before holding face-to-face talks." These conditions now
have to be met "at the end of talks." The U.S. acknowledges there are
only about 50 al Qaeda members in Afghanistan these days.
(2) Neighboring Pakistan, which is essential to keep
the Taliban under control in Afghanistan and as a transmission line for
war supplies, is deeply distrusted by Washington, but Pakistan's
assistance in the region is required to bring about a peace agreement.
Since Islamabad likewise distrusts the U.S. but appreciates its cash
subsidies and needs a superpower friend as protection against its
perhaps exaggerated fear of Indian enmity, the relationship remains
viable — but the Obama government wants American troops to guide the
process on the ground and for possible incursions into western Pakistan.
There have been reports that the U.S. was aggrieved
to discover bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan for years. But cooperation
will continue and the full details may not be revealed for years by
either side, though each probably knows everything about the other's
role in this affair. As they cooperate, both countries have been spying
upon and keeping secrets from each other, and their findings may best
remain among themselves.
(3) Most importantly the U.S. has no desire to
completely withdraw from its only foothold in Central Asia, militarily
positioned close to what are perceived to be its two main enemies with
nuclear weapons (China, Russia), and two volatile nuclear powers backed
by the U.S. but not completely under its control by any means (Pakistan,
India). Also, this fortuitous geography is flanking the extraordinary
oil and natural gas wealth of the Caspian Basin and energy-endowed
former Soviet Muslim republics such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
Lastly, Iran — a possible future imperial prize — is situated between
Iraq to the west and Afghanistan to the east. The U.S. wants to keep
troops nearby for any contingency.
Washington's foothold in Central Asia is a potential
geopolitical treasure, particularly as Obama, like Bush before him,
seeks to prevent Beijing and Moscow from extending their influence in
what is actually their own back yard, not America's.
Both former Cold War adversaries are acutely aware of
Washington's intentions and are trying to block U.S. maneuvers through
the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other means, such as
Beijing's recent warm and supportive gestures toward an appreciative
Islamabad. While China and Russia have supported the U.S. war in
Afghanistan, they both — and no doubt Pakistan and India as well —
strongly oppose the prospect of a long term U.S./NATO military presence
in the region.
The White House has been twisting the Kabul
government's arm to sign a "status of forces" agreement allowing a
relatively large American contingent of troops, special forces, CIA
operatives, paramilitary contractors, military trainers, etc. — perhaps
between 10,000-20,000 occupying up to six military bases — to remain in
Afghanistan after the end of the 2014 pullout date. President Obama
might then claim that the Afghans requested the forces for their own
security. So far the Karzai government is holding out, but eventual
agreement is probable.
The closest Obama has come to publicly acknowledging
the partial withdrawal effort was on 60 Minutes May 8 with the obscure
comment that "we don't need to have a perpetual footprint of the size we
have now."
The main problem in keeping a smaller "perpetual
footprint" is that the Taliban insists on a total withdrawal and
abandonment of all U.S. bases as well as troops. Otherwise they won't
agree to the truce that is necessary to justify Obama's "honorable"
withdrawal. The U.S. seems intent upon pounding the Taliban militarily
until it agrees. Eventually, Washington may prevail by offering the
Taliban more money and more political and administrative power in the
new arrangement. Perhaps the troops might be renamed "contractors" and
the U.S. could transfer the bases to Kabul, which would lease them back
to the Americans.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE:
Before mentioning the Obama/Netanyahu brouhaha in late May, we'll touch upon why the Israel-Palestine situation is central to America's MENA/Central Asia policy, and note why the U.S. seeks a two-state solution to the Palestinian question and why the present Israeli government won't go along.
Before mentioning the Obama/Netanyahu brouhaha in late May, we'll touch upon why the Israel-Palestine situation is central to America's MENA/Central Asia policy, and note why the U.S. seeks a two-state solution to the Palestinian question and why the present Israeli government won't go along.
The U.S. and most of its European allies view Israel
as an important "Western" political, military and intelligence outpost
in a resource-strategic, volatile and now "unstable" region of the world
populated almost entirely by Arab Muslims. It will not allow Israel to
go under.
Washington's superpower influence has convinced most
Arab governments to mute their criticisms of Israel's mistreatment of
the Palestinians, (Syria and Libya have been exceptions), but the Arab
masses have always supported the cause of the Palestinian people and
denounce both Israel and its American enabler. Now that these masses are
beginning to speak for themselves the Palestine question is more
important than ever.
The oppression of the Palestinian people is the main
cause of anti-American attitudes throughout the Islamic world of about
1.4 billion people, mostly in 47 countries with majority Muslim
populations. This number will grow to 2 billion by 2030.
At this time the U.S. is fighting in five Muslim
countries, and seeking to seduce several resource-rich Central Asian
Muslim countries while retaining its Arab satellites in MENA. Meanwhile,
Washington is presiding over a debt-ridden ailing economy, its world
leadership is declining, and several developing countries, led by China,
are rising and seeking a more equitable world order than that put into
place at the end of World War II when half the globe was subjugated to
the big colonialist and imperialist powers.
Obviously, something has to give — and "resolving"
the Palestinian crisis with two states seems to be the quickest and
least expensive way for Washington to win the good graces of a fifth of
the world population at a time when U.S. "leadership" is losing clout.
A fairly broad section of Israeli opinion also sees
two states as a way out of the Palestinian dilemma — but the country is
presently in the hands of a right/far right government led by
Netanyahu's Likud Party, the anti-democratic and racist Yisrael Beiteinu
extremists led by Avigdor Lieberman, and the ultra-orthodox religious
party Shas. Most of these right wing extremists will do everything
possible to stall an agreement with the Palestinians in hopes that in
time something — anything — will happen that will allow the West Bank,
East Jerusalem and Gaza to be annexed to Israel proper.
The ultra-orthodox community (10% but growing fast),
backed by many other religious citizens, adhere to the superstition that
the deity "gave" Israel to the Jews, and that the Arabs are interlopers
who should emigrate elsewhere. Many in Yisrael Beiteinu also want the
Arabs to leave, but for ultra-nationalist reasons. Likud seems less
fanatical but depends on the far right to retain power.
Since the U.S. government has made it clear for
decades that it will defend, support and subsidize the State of Israel
under all conditions, what's behind the headlines in recent days about a
sharp disagreement between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President
Obama?
Frankly, during his visit to the U.S. — where he met
with Obama, addressed Congress and delivered a speech to the pro-Israel
lobby AIPAC — Netanyahu made a mountain out of a molehill to divert
attention from his government's refusal to take the basic steps required
to resume negotiations with the Palestinians leading toward creation of
two states.
The "molehill" was Obama's call for the resumption of
talks between both sides based on the boundaries that existed before
the June war 1967 with "mutually agreed land swaps."(Israel still
occupies and is building settlements upon the land it seized in
contravention of international law.)
The "molehill" was Obama's call for the resumption of
talks between both sides based on the boundaries that existed in 1967
with "mutually agreed land swaps."
Actually, this has been the basic U.S. position for
nearly two decades in discussions with Israel and talks between both
sides. The Clinton and Bush 2 Administrations were in general agreement.
The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank agrees with it, and now
Hamas in Gaza as well, as did previous Israeli governments. They
understood — as Obama made sure to articulate to the Israeli leader —
that the "mutually agreed swaps" of land would be part of a final
boundary agreement.
This means that a method would be found for Israelis
to obtain much of the Palestinian land where it has illegally settled
500,000 of its citizens in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in exchange
for swapping some of its own land and other concessions. Naturally, land
would be exchanged to make it possible for the two parts of Palestine
to be connected, even if just a narrow corridor.
The "mountain" was Netanyahu's intentional
misunderstanding that as a result of talks Israel was being told to
return to the 1967 borders, which he charged were now "indefensible."
All that was missing from his distortion was the allegation that Obama
was now adding one more "existential" menace to the plethora of dangers
facing Israel, but it was implied. Both AIPAC and Congress focused on
protecting Israel and genuflecting to Netanyahu. Obama's cautious and
weak call for talks was brushed aside, as Netanyahu had planned.
The House and Senate — Democrats and Republicans, in a
rare display of bipartisanship — gave the Israeli leader a tremendous
welcome replete with a score of standing ovations. Congress has been
even more pro-Israel than the White House over the last decades. Part of
the reason is the remarkable effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobbies on
election campaigns. Some politicians owe their careers to AIPAC, and
some have lost their careers when they publicly questioned Israel's
sanctity.
Another part stems from the political power of tens
of millions of Christian evangelicals and fundamentalists who not only
accept the supernatural theory that a divine being "gave" Israel to the
Jews but believe the Christian superstition that the Jews must be in
full possession of Israel (Palestine) before Jesus Christ will return to
Earth for the "Rapture."
Aside from Obama's 1967 borders remark, all his
comments just before and during Netanyahu's self-serving visit were
paeans to Israel and pledges of America's support. He also displayed a
dismaying inability to recognize a difference between oppressed and
oppressor.
Obama (1) refused to call on Israel to stop building
settlements in Palestinian territory; (2) omitted mention of Israel's
illegal demand to annex all Jerusalem; (3) did not refer to the
Palestinian refugee situation; (4) insisted that the PA withdraw its
application for statehood set to be debated at the UN in September, with
a good chance of General Assembly approval (though an inevitable U.S.
Security Council veto will obviate the vote); (5) opposed the unity
moves between Fatah/PA in West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.
In addition Obama argued that the Palestinians must
not only recognize the existence of Israel but should acknowledge
"Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland of the Jewish people." In
normal diplomatic exchanges mutual recognition is sufficient, without
all the bending over backward expected of the Palestinians.
As far as state and homeland are concerned, there are
more than a million Palestinians who have been living in what is now
Israel since 1948 and for many generations earlier, in addition to
refugees whose demand for a "right to return" has not been addressed.
This is a matter for the negotiations, not dismissal beforehand by
defining Israel in such fashion.
Many demands on both sides will be negotiated — but
any commitments take place after, not before, negotiations. One more
point on recognition. Much is made out of the fact that Hamas (and Fatah
as well, but this usually is not mentioned) does not "recognize"
Israel. But according to international law, recognition is between two
states, not between a political party and a state.
Even when the right/far right coalition led by
Netanyahu is defeated in a couple of years by the center right Kadima
Party, it will be somewhat easier but still very rough going for the
Palestinians. The political left is very small. There is no powerful
center or center left party (though the weakened center-right Labor
Party, which would join the new ruling coalition, sometimes thinks of
itself as center left), and Kadima would have to make concessions to its
coalition partners, then to the powerful right/far right in parliament,
and then to the settlers and the die-hards.
Kadima, an offshoot of Likud, is led by former
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni who calls for negotiations with the PA,
including land swaps, leading to a Palestinian state. But both Obama and
Livni have made it clear in the past that the state they envisage for
the Palestinians would be extremely weak, dependent on conservative Arab
countries and the U.S., and probably not even allowed to have its own
defense forces.
Right now, even that hurdle seems to be a long
distance down a road that resembles an obstacle course, but the
Palestinian people have shown themselves to be extremely persistent in
the face of great odds, and whatever their final objective in the
struggles to come they just might get there.
For our three-part article on "The U.S.-NATO War Against Libya," see the April 9, 2011, Activist Newsletter at http://activistnewsletter.blogspot.com/